AvailableNepali translation awaiting review

Labour migration and remittances

Hundreds of thousands of Nepalis leave each year to work abroad, and the money they send home now runs into trillions of rupees. The open questions are how to protect them, who should pay the cost of going, how to use remittances, and how to make going abroad a choice and not a necessity.

Long-term goalMake working abroad a choice, not a necessity

The Constitution directs the state to increase employment at home and to put the capital, skills and experience gained abroad to productive use in Nepal. The 16th Plan says that because jobs at home are limited young people will keep going abroad for some time, and it aims to end migration driven by compulsion. This takes years and depends on wider economic change.75

Contested choiceWho recruits workers, and who pays the cost of going

The law provides for licensed private agencies and government-to-government arrangements, and individual applications are growing fast. Official policy says employers should bear recruitment costs, but the Labour Ministry has drafted an amendment on what workers would pay when employers do not. Reasonable people disagree on how far to rely on each channel and how strictly to enforce zero cost.1312319

Contested choiceHow far government should steer how remittances are used

Government plans and the 2083/84 budget aim to move remittances from consumption into investment. The Labour Ministry's own report cautions against calling remittance spending 'unproductive', pointing to its role in reducing poverty and to improved saving and spending on education among receiving households. The balance between household choice and public steering is a real policy choice.184

Urgent problemDeaths, injuries and fraud affecting workers now

The Foreign Employment Board paid support to the families of more than 1,200 deceased migrant workers in each of 2022/23 and 2023/24, and to hundreds of injured workers. Fraud, contract substitution and withheld money are among the cases registered at Migrant Resource Centres. These harms happen every year regardless of longer-term reforms.128

Updated 2026-10-10 · Version 2 · Sources · Corrections & right of reply

Question 1

What is the issue, and why does it matter?

Working abroad is a mass experience. The Department of Foreign Employment issued more than 5.7 million new labour approvals between 2008/09 and 2023/24. In fiscal year 2025/26, 406,414 Nepalis took first-time approval for foreign employment and 385,789 renewed one, compared with 505,957 and 333,309 the year before. The 2021 census counted more than 2.1 million Nepalis absent from the country, 77 per cent of them for work-related reasons (as reported by the Labour Ministry).123

Remittances are central to household and national finances. Nepal Rastra Bank's provisional figures show remittance inflows of Rs 2,363.13 billion in 2025/26, up 37.1 per cent on the previous year. Analysis of the Nepal Living Standards Survey 2022/23 found that 35.6 per cent of households received remittances from abroad, with large differences between provinces in the average amount received.24

The 16th Plan describes the pattern behind these numbers: for three decades the domestic labour market has had little capacity to absorb new workers, so surplus labour goes abroad. It notes that about 57 per cent of households were estimated to depend on remittance income and calls for ending migration out of compulsion while making foreign employment safer.5

Question 2

What do current law and policy say?

Constitution: every citizen has the right to employment and to choose their employment (Article 33), and every worker has the right to fair labour practice (Article 34). Among the state policies, Article 51(i) commits the state to increase employment at home, to regulate foreign employment so that it is free of exploitation, safe and orderly while guaranteeing workers' rights, and to encourage putting the capital, skills, technology and experience gained abroad into productive sectors at home. Passports, visas and immigration are federal matters; social security and employment are shared between federal and provincial governments; collecting data on the unemployed is a local government function.678

Foreign Employment Act, 2064 (2007), as amended in 2072, 2075 and 2082: only licensed agencies may recruit, and they must lodge a cash deposit and bank guarantee that rise with the number of workers sent (sections 10–11). No one under 18 may be sent (section 7) and there must be no gender discrimination (section 8). Government sets the maximum service fee and promotion cost per worker for a given country or company (section 24); the contract must be explained to the worker and translated into Nepali (section 25); and every worker must be insured for at least Rs 500,000 for the whole contract (section 26). Workers must take skills training where the job requires it (section 30), and a 2082 amendment added skills testing by the National Academy of Vocational Training (section 30A). Government may designate destination countries, sign bilateral labour agreements and send workers government-to-government (sections 3, 4 and 6).910111213

Welfare and institutions: the Act creates a Foreign Employment Welfare Fund under the Foreign Employment Board, financed partly by workers' pre-departure contributions and licence fees, and used for skills training, repatriation, compensation and family support after injury or death, legal defence abroad, awareness, and job programmes for returnees (sections 32–33, 38). Since March 2023 migrant workers can join the contribution-based Social Security Fund, and enrolment is mandatory before a labour approval is issued. According to the Labour Ministry, the Labour Migration Policy, 2025 calls for developing skilled, well-informed workers in line with international labour market demand while promoting self-employment and entrepreneurship, with the aim of ending forced labour migration.141516

Current government priorities: the 16th Plan (2081/82–2085/86) calls for a zero-cost system in which employers bear recruitment costs, more labour agreements with safe, higher-income destinations, skills certification, and linking remittances to production. The 2083/84 budget speech announces a 'remittance–investment matching fund', a returnee migrant programme, review of labour agreements and new ones with new destinations, arranging for workers to go only after gaining skills, collateral-free loans and instalment payments from employers, encouraging zero cost while making service fees 'worker-friendly', and a lottery based on formal remittance receipts. Separately, news reports in Asar 2083 said the Labour Ministry had drafted an amendment bill to set the service fee workers pay when the destination employer does not bear the cost; this page found no record of it being passed.171819

Question 3

What is known, uncertain or disputed?

Known

Who goes and where: in 2022/23 and 2023/24, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Malaysia accounted for 81.3 per cent of new labour approvals, though tens of thousands now go to Central and Eastern Europe. Women's share of new approvals reached 12.9 per cent in 2023/24. New approvals applied for individually (without a recruitment agency) rose from 26,740 in 2021/22 to 69,175 in 2022/23 and 95,038 in 2023/24. Koshi and Madhesh send the most workers; Karnali and Sudurpaschim the fewest.120

How remittances are used and how protected workers are: households receiving remittances named daily consumption as the first use (72.3 per cent in 2022/23) followed by repaying loans (13.5 per cent), with children's education the most common second use. Between 1 March 2023 and 10 June 2025, 1,652,763 migrant workers were enrolled in the Social Security Fund, but only 1.6 per cent had continued contributing.415

Uncertain

How many Nepalis work in India is not known with confidence. The 2021 census counted 587,510 Nepalis working in India, the Nepal Living Standards Survey 2022/23 estimated more than one million, and the Labour Ministry says even that is likely an underestimate because seasonal work lasting under six months is not recorded. Labour approval data do not cover work in India, because the Department of Foreign Employment does not collect it, so the approval figures above leave it out.320

The real causes of many migrant deaths are unclear. Destination countries certified most deaths as due to 'natural causes'. The Labour Ministry's report notes that workers in the Gulf are particularly exposed to extreme heat and points to research linking heat stress with heart-disease deaths, and heat stress combined with hard labour and dehydration with kidney disease, but the reviewed sources do not establish how many deaths these explain.121

Headline measures differ between official documents. The Labour Ministry's report gives remittances as 25.3 per cent of GDP in 2023/24 using Nepal Rastra Bank data, but also cites a World Bank ratio of 33.1 per cent for 2024; the 16th Plan put it at about 23 per cent for 2079/80. The 16th Plan's text says Nepal had labour agreements with 12 destination countries, while its own target table gives a baseline of 10.34522

In 2025/26 first-time labour approvals fell (406,414, down from 505,957) while remittance inflows rose 37.1 per cent, according to Nepal Rastra Bank's provisional annual figures. The sources reviewed for this page do not explain the gap, so it should not be read as evidence for any particular cause.2

Disputed

Whether remittances are 'wasted' on consumption is contested. Government plans and the 2083/84 budget aim to move remittances from consumption into production. The Labour Ministry's 2024 report, however, says there are 'strong narratives' about unproductive use but stresses remittances' role in reducing poverty and says that savings and investment, including in education, have improved among receiving households over the past decade. The report's own table shows savings rising as a stated use while 'investments' as a first-priority use fell (from 4.3 to 1.3 per cent of receiving households between the 2010/11 and 2022/23 surveys).17184

Questions 4–5

What are the options, and what do they cost and achieve?

Options are listed in no particular order. Policy Nepal does not recommend one; real policies often combine them.

Enforce zero cost: make employers pay recruitment costs171823241119

Make the 'employer pays' principle real through labour agreements, closer monitoring of recruitment agencies, and penalties for overcharging, so that workers do not borrow heavily to go abroad.

Benefits
  • Less pre-departure debt for workers and their families, so more of what they earn abroad stays with them.
  • Reduces the room for fraud and hidden charges that lead to complaints and cases.
Costs
  • Needs inspectors, digital tracking and investigators at the Department of Foreign Employment and in districts.
  • Some employers may turn to workers from countries that charge less, reducing demand for Nepali workers.
Trade-offs
  • Strict enforcement may push some recruitment into informal channels if demand stays high; a softer approach, such as the drafted bill setting a fee for workers where employers do not pay, accepts some cost to workers but may keep more recruitment in legal channels.
What implementation needs
  • Write employer-pays clauses into every bilateral labour agreement, as the Labour Ministry plans.
  • Use the Foreign Employment Information Management System to monitor recruitment and register complaints online, and strengthen complaint handling through Chief District Officers and the Department.

Skills first: train and certify workers before they go17221812

Expand pre-departure skills training and testing so more workers go as skilled workers, earning more and facing fewer risks, as the 16th Plan and 2083/84 budget propose.

Benefits
  • Skilled jobs often pay more and can open higher-income destinations.
  • Certified skills can also be recognised at home when workers return.
Costs
  • Training centres, testing capacity and quality control cost money and take time to build, especially outside major cities.
  • If training becomes a mandatory hurdle, it can add cost and delay for poorer workers.
Trade-offs
  • Requiring skills before departure protects workers but may reduce the number who can leave quickly; leaving it voluntary keeps access open but changes the skills mix more slowly.
What implementation needs
  • Apply the 2082 amendment on skills testing (section 30A) and match training to destination-country standards.
  • Track the 16th Plan target of raising the skilled share of departing workers from 73.73 to 80 per cent.

More labour agreements, safer destinations and stronger embassies131221824

Negotiate more and better bilateral labour agreements, expand government-to-government schemes such as those with South Korea, Israel and the UK, and strengthen embassies' labour staff and capacity to protect workers abroad.

Benefits
  • Agreements can set out wages, insurance, rescue and repatriation duties in writing.
  • Government-to-government channels can have lower costs and fewer intermediaries.
Costs
  • Diplomatic capacity and labour attachés cost money, and destination countries may not agree to strong terms.
  • Government-to-government schemes so far cover relatively small numbers compared with total departures.
Trade-offs
  • A larger state role in recruitment can reduce abuse, but it competes with private agencies and the growing number of individual applicants, and depends on government capacity to run it well.
What implementation needs
  • Use the Act's powers to designate countries, sign agreements and send workers through government channels (sections 3, 4, 6).
  • Track the 16th Plan target of labour agreements with 15 destination countries by 2085/86.

Channel remittances and returnee skills into investment1872542422

Offer matching funds, concessional loans, training and market links so remittance-receiving households and returnees can start businesses or invest, as in the 2083/84 budget's proposed remittance–investment matching fund.

Benefits
  • Can create jobs at home and use skills learned abroad, as the Constitution encourages.
  • Could address problems returnees themselves report, such as difficulty getting loans.
Costs
  • Subsidies and matching funds use public money, and some businesses will fail.
  • Schemes can favour better-off households that already have savings.
Trade-offs
  • Steering remittances toward investment may conflict with households' own priorities, such as food, debt repayment and children's schooling, which official data show are the main uses.
What implementation needs
  • Coordinate the Foreign Employment Board's reintegration programmes with local governments' employment service centres.
  • Track the 16th Plan target of 100,000 people a year benefiting from reintegration programmes.

Create decent jobs at home so migration becomes a choice752226

Focus on raising domestic employment and productivity, for example through labour-intensive industries and the budget's proposed employment-linked production zones, so fewer people feel forced to leave.

Benefits
  • Directly serves the constitutional aim of increasing employment at home.
  • Reduces family separation and the social costs the 16th Plan associates with migration.
Costs
  • Depends on investment, infrastructure and wider economic reform that take many years.
  • Domestic wages may remain well below what workers can earn abroad.
Trade-offs
  • Prioritising jobs at home may mean less attention or spending on protecting the very large number of people who will keep going abroad in the meantime.
What implementation needs
  • Track the 16th Plan targets of 1.5 million jobs a year and an unemployment rate of 5 per cent by 2085/86.

Combining options

These options are not mutually exclusive, and official plans already mix them. The 16th Plan and the 2083/84 budget combine zero-cost recruitment, skills-first migration, new labour agreements and remittance investment, while also aiming to create jobs at home. The real choices are about emphasis and sequencing: how much money and administrative effort goes to protecting people who leave now versus building alternatives at home, and how strictly rules on cost and skills are enforced given the risk of pushing people into informal routes. Social protection, such as keeping migrants contributing to the Social Security Fund, supports all of them.

Question 6

Who is responsible?

Federal
Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security

Lead federal agency that designs labour migration policy and programmes.1

Federal
Department of Foreign Employment

Regulates and oversees labour migration: licenses recruitment agencies, issues labour approvals, investigates offences and handles compensation complaints.11027

Federal
Foreign Employment Board

Autonomous body that manages the Welfare Fund and provides welfare and reintegration support to workers and families.141

Independent body
Foreign Employment Tribunal

Adjudicates legal cases related to labour migration.128

Federal
National Academy of Vocational Training

Delivers vocational training to migrant workers and, since the 2082 amendment, tests skills for training of up to six months.112

Federal
Nepali embassies and labour attachés

Promote Nepali workers' interests in destination countries; workers abroad can obtain a labour approval from the mission up to two times.29

Federal
Social Security Fund

Runs the contribution-based schemes that migrant workers must join before getting a labour approval.15

Provincial
Provincial governments

Share authority over social security and employment with the federation; according to the Labour Ministry's 2024 report, Bagmati, Madhesh and Gandaki had approved provincial labour and migration policies and Koshi and Lumbini were finalising theirs.816

Local
Local governments (rural municipalities and municipalities)

Employment Service Centres operate at all 753 local levels, collect data on the unemployed and support labour approval applications; some local governments have prepared migration profiles and safer-migration guidelines with Labour Ministry support.1816

Independent body
Nepal Rastra Bank

Publishes official remittance statistics and labour approval counts as part of its regular macroeconomic reports.2

Question 7

What have parties and leaders said and done?

What was said or promised is shown apart from what was recorded as done. Every entry needs a dated source. A missing entry means the position is not established, not that someone opposes or is neutral.

Party positions on labour migration are still being researched. To keep coverage fair, they will be added for every party with seats in the House of Representatives at the same time, each from that party's own documents. The records above are government actions (budget, payments and laws) and do not represent any party.

Said or promised

Position not established in reviewed sources.

Recorded actions and outcomes

Funding decision · 2083 Jestha 15

Government of Nepal (Ministry of Finance)

The 2083/84 budget allocates Rs 3.63 billion to the labour and employment sector, alongside announced measures on foreign employment and remittances (paragraph 54).18

Implementation · 2022/23 and 2023/24

Foreign Employment Board

Paid NPR 655.18 million to families of 1,208 deceased workers and NPR 99.71 million to 369 injured workers in 2022/23; and NPR 699.91 million to families of 1,346 deceased workers and NPR 194.39 million to 653 injured workers in 2023/24.1

Implementation · 2082/04/14

Federal Parliament

Amended the Foreign Employment Act through the Some Nepal Acts Amendment Act, 2082 (dated 2082/04/14 in the Law Commission's consolidated text), which among other changes added skills testing for pre-departure training (section 30A).912

Question 8

What would progress look like, and when do we check again?

IndicatorLatest official figureOfficial targetRevisit
Share of skilled workers among those going for foreign employment22 73.73 per cent (FY 2079/80)22 80 per cent (FY 2085/86)22 2027-08
Number of destination countries with a labour agreement22 10 (the Plan's text elsewhere says 12) (FY 2079/80)225 15 (FY 2085/86)22 2027-08
Migrant Resource Centres and sub-centres established and operating22 42 (FY 2079/80)22 94 (FY 2085/86)22 2027-08
People benefiting from reintegration programmes each year22 Not established 100,000 a year (FY 2085/86)22 2027-08
First-time labour approvals and remittance inflows (tracked annually; no official target)2 406,414 first-time approvals; Rs 2,363.13 billion in remittances (provisional) (FY 2025/26 (2082/83))2 No official target found 2027-08

Sources

Grouped by type of evidence. Government plans show what government intends; they are not proof of results. Party material shows what a party says.

Constitution & law

  1. नेपालको संविधान (Constitution of Nepal), consolidated Nepali text incl. first and second amendments — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, 2072/06/03 (promulgation); amended 2072 and 2077; unicode file dated Bhadra 2081. Part 3, Article 33 (right to employment) and Article 34 (right to labour). Checked 2026-10-09
  2. नेपालको संविधान (Constitution of Nepal), consolidated Nepali text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, 2072/06/03 (promulgation); amended 2072 and 2077. Part 4, Article 51(i) [Nepali: धारा ५१ (झ)] policies relating to labour and employment, clauses (1), (5), (6). Checked 2026-10-09
  3. नेपालको संविधान (Constitution of Nepal), consolidated Nepali text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, 2072/06/03 (promulgation); amended 2072 and 2077. Schedule 5, item 22 (citizenship, passport, visa, immigration); Schedule 7, item 11 (social security and employment, trade unions, labour rights and disputes); Schedule 8, item 17 (collection of data on the unemployed). Checked 2026-10-09
  4. वैदेशिक रोजगार ऐन, २०६४ (Foreign Employment Act, 2064) — consolidated text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Authenticated 2064/05/19; amended 2072/06/14, 2075/11/19, 2082/04/14. Title page (list of amending Acts) and Preamble, p. 1. Checked 2026-10-09
  5. वैदेशिक रोजगार ऐन, २०६४ (Foreign Employment Act, 2064) — consolidated text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Authenticated 2064/05/19; as amended to 2082. Sections 7 (no minors), 8 (no gender discrimination), 9 (special facilities/reservation), 10–11 (licence required; cash deposit and bank guarantee tiers, as amended 2075), pp. 5–6. Checked 2026-10-09
  6. वैदेशिक रोजगार ऐन, २०६४ (Foreign Employment Act, 2064) — consolidated text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Authenticated 2064/05/19; as amended to 2082. Sections 24 (maximum service fee and promotion cost), 25 (contract explained and translated into Nepali), 26(1) (insurance of at least Rs 500,000), p. 16. Checked 2026-10-09
  7. वैदेशिक रोजगार ऐन, २०६४ (Foreign Employment Act, 2064) — consolidated text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Authenticated 2064/05/19; Section 30A inserted by Some Nepal Acts Amendment Act, 2082. Section 30 (skills training required), Section 30A [३०क] (skills testing by National Academy of Vocational Training for training up to six months; footnote marks it as added in 2082), pp. 18–19. Checked 2026-10-09
  8. वैदेशिक रोजगार ऐन, २०६४ (Foreign Employment Act, 2064) — consolidated text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Authenticated 2064/05/19; as amended to 2082. Chapter 2, Sections 3 (designating countries), 4 (bilateral agreements), 5 (selecting agencies on request) and 6 (sending workers by treaty/agreement through government bodies; steering committee), pp. 3–5. Checked 2026-10-09
  9. वैदेशिक रोजगार ऐन, २०६४ (Foreign Employment Act, 2064) — consolidated text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Authenticated 2064/05/19; as amended to 2082. Chapter 6, Sections 32 (Welfare Fund established under the Board; sources of money) and 33 (uses of the Fund), pp. 19–20; Chapter 8, Section 38 (formation of the Foreign Employment Board), p. 22. Checked 2026-10-09
  10. वैदेशिक रोजगार ऐन, २०६४ (Foreign Employment Act, 2064) — consolidated text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Authenticated 2064/05/19; as amended to 2082. Section 36 (complaint to the Department for compensation), p. 22; Section 61 (investigation by the Department; licence suspension up to six months), pp. 32–33. Checked 2026-10-09
  11. वैदेशिक रोजगार ऐन, २०६४ (Foreign Employment Act, 2064) — consolidated text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Authenticated 2064/05/19; as amended to 2082. Section 2(ṭha) [२(ठ)] definition of labour attaché, p. 3; Section 21B [२१ख] re-approval via diplomatic missions (max. two times), p. 15. Checked 2026-10-09

Government plans & policy

  1. सोह्रौं योजना (आर्थिक वर्ष २०८१/८२–२०८५/८६) — The Sixteenth Plan — National Planning Commission, Government of Nepal, 2081 Jestha. Chapter 4 (Productive employment, decent work and sustainable social security), sections 4.1–4.2, pp. 87–89. Checked 2026-10-09
  2. Nepal Labour Migration Report 2024 — Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Government of Nepal, 2025. Chapter 2: institutional overview item 7, Employment Service Centres, p. 9; section 2.5.1 and Box 2.1 (support to local governments; note on provincial policies), pp. 12–13; section 2.8 Table 2.8 (Labour Migration Policy, 2025), p. 18. Checked 2026-10-09
  3. सोह्रौं योजना (आर्थिक वर्ष २०८१/८२–२०८५/८६) — The Sixteenth Plan — National Planning Commission, Government of Nepal, 2081 Jestha. Chapter 4: section 4.3 key issues and challenges, item (4) foreign employment management incl. implementing the zero-cost system, p. 91; section 4.4 transformative strategy (4) on all stages of foreign employment (new high-income destinations and labour agreements, skills-based migration, linking remittances to production), p. 93, and strategy (7) incl. certifying returnees' skills, pp. 94–95; section 4.5 programme (4) foreign employment management (employer-pays policy, skills before departure) and programme (5) strengthening missions, pp. 96–97. Checked 2026-10-09
  4. आर्थिक वर्ष २०८३/८४ को बजेट वक्तव्य (Budget Speech FY 2083/84) — Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal, 2083 Jestha 15. Paragraph 54 'Labour and foreign employment', clauses (a)–(f) and allocation line, p. 33. Checked 2026-10-09
  5. सोह्रौं योजना (आर्थिक वर्ष २०८१/८२–२०८५/८६) — The Sixteenth Plan — National Planning Commission, Government of Nepal, 2081 Jestha. Chapter 4, section 4.6 Quantitative targets table, rows 1, 6, 10, 12, 14, 15, pp. 98–99. Checked 2026-10-09
  6. Nepal Labour Migration Report 2024 — Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Government of Nepal, 2025. Chapter 4, section 4.1 Recruitment Practices, p. 61. Checked 2026-10-09
  7. Nepal Labour Migration Report 2024 — Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Government of Nepal, 2025. Chapter 5 Way Forward (curbing recruitment fees; protection in destination countries; remittances; reintegration), pp. 83–86. Checked 2026-10-09
  8. आर्थिक वर्ष २०८३/८४ को बजेट वक्तव्य (Budget Speech FY 2083/84) — Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal, 2083 Jestha 15. Paragraph 55(a) 'Industrial development' — employment-linked production zones, p. 33. Checked 2026-10-09

Official data

  1. Nepal Labour Migration Report 2024 — Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Government of Nepal, 2025 (copyright 2025); covers FY 2022/23 and 2023/24. Executive Summary, pp. xiv–xv. Checked 2026-10-09
  2. Current Macroeconomic and Financial Situation of Nepal — English (Based on Annual Data of 2025/26) — Nepal Rastra Bank, Data to mid-July 2026; posted 26 August 2026. 'Remittances' paragraphs 36, 37 and 39, pp. 5–6. Checked 2026-10-09
  3. Nepal Labour Migration Report 2024 — Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Government of Nepal, 2025. Chapter 1, section 1.1 Introduction, pp. 1–2. Checked 2026-10-09
  4. Nepal Labour Migration Report 2024 — Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Government of Nepal, 2025. Chapter 4, section 4.4 Migrants' Remittances and Investments, Figures 4.4–4.5 and Tables 4.8–4.9, pp. 68–71. Checked 2026-10-09
  5. Nepal Labour Migration Report 2024 — Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Government of Nepal, 2025. Chapter 4, section 4.8.2 Contribution-based Social Security Scheme for Migrant Workers in Nepal, pp. 77–78. Checked 2026-10-09
  6. Nepal Labour Migration Report 2024 — Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Government of Nepal, 2025. Chapter 3 introduction (India and irregular routes not in DoFE data), p. 21; Table 3.1 (new approvals by destination), p. 24; section 3.2 and Figure 3.5 (women's share of new approvals), p. 25; section 3.5.2 Individual Labour Approvals and Figure 3.14, pp. 34–36. Checked 2026-10-09
  7. Nepal Labour Migration Report 2024 — Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Government of Nepal, 2025. Chapter 4, section 4.2 Health and Safety of Migrant Workers, p. 62. Checked 2026-10-09
  8. Nepal Labour Migration Report 2024 — Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Government of Nepal, 2025. Chapter 4, section 4.5 Reintegration of Returnee Migrants, Figures 4.6–4.7 (source: ReMi 2024), pp. 71–72. Checked 2026-10-09
  9. Nepal Labour Migration Report 2024 — Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Government of Nepal, 2025. Chapter 4, section 4.3 Access to Justice and Table 4.7 (cases registered at Migrant Resource Centres), pp. 67–68. Checked 2026-10-09

News reports

  1. What amendments is the government making to the Foreign Employment Act? — Kantipur (ekantipur.com, English edition), 2083 Asar 23 (7 July 2026); author Hom Karki. Headline and lead paragraph. Checked 2026-10-09

Corrections & right of reply

Parties, leaders and readers may ask us to correct an error or add a documented response. Corrections are published visibly with the date and reason; no one can pay to change coverage.

The submission channel is not open yet. It will open once an editorial contact and review process are in place.

Change history
  1. 2026-10-09 — First draft of the labour migration issue page (all eight questions), with sources opened on this date. (New topic page for the National Agenda; submitted for editorial and native Nepali review. Party positions deliberately left out pending research covering all parties in the House at once.)
  2. 2026-10-10 — Standardised सङ्घीय संसद् spelling to match the rest of the site (Consistency check in the agenda build)
  3. 2026-10-10 — Independent verification: every cited source re-downloaded and checked at its locator (NRB 2025/26 annual, Nepal Labour Migration Report 2024, Foreign Employment Act consolidated text, Constitution Nepali and English texts, 16th Plan ch. 4, Budget Speech 2083/84 paras 54–55, Kantipur lead). Most figures confirmed unchanged. (Pre-publication fact-check; see the Verification section in research-notes/labour-migration.md.)
  4. 2026-10-10 — Corrected individually applied labour approvals: 26,740 is the 2021/22 figure, not 2022/23; now reads 26,740 (2021/22), 69,175 (2022/23), 95,038 (2023/24). Added source nlmr-2024-approvals (chapter 3). (The report's executive summary mislabels the years; section 3.5.2 and Figure 3.14 of the same report give the series. Women's 12.9% share clarified as share of new approvals (Figure 3.5).)
  5. 2026-10-10 — Labour Migration Policy, 2025 wording changed from 'make migration more productive ... jobs at home' to the report's description (skilled, well-informed workers for international demand; self-employment and entrepreneurship; ending forced labour migration), attributed to the Labour Ministry. (Original paraphrase went beyond Table 2.8; the policy text itself was not opened.)
  6. 2026-10-10 — Budget 2083/84 list: loan clause reworded to 'collateral-free loans and instalment payments from employers'; added para 54(d)'s 'encouraging zero cost while making service fees worker-friendly'. (Earlier wording read more into the clause than the text says; the zero-cost/service-fee sentence is in the same clause and bears directly on the contested recruitment-cost choice.)
  7. 2026-10-10 — Softened or tightened: provinces with labour/migration policies named (3 approved, 2 finalising); local governments' migration profiles/guidelines limited to 'some' local governments; health-research summary aligned with section 4.2; India item now says DoFE does not collect India data (instead of asserting the legal rule); remittance provincial gap specified as average amount; embassy role limited to 'promote interests'; FEIMS implementation tied to recruitment monitoring and online complaints; NRB 2025/26 figures marked provisional; section 24 'per worker' added to English. (Each claim checked against the cited locator and reworded to match what the source says.)
  8. 2026-10-10 — Disputed item on remittance use now also notes the report's own Table 4.9 (investment as first priority fell from 4.3% to 1.3%; savings rose). Classification rationale on remittances reworded to match the report. (Balance: the report's narrative and its table point in different directions on investment.)
  9. 2026-10-10 — Options: hedged uncited editorial claims ('often', 'can', 'could'); trade-off on the drafted fee bill no longer implies a motive; option 3 embassy wording aligned with sources. (Neutrality: options are editorial reasoning and should not read as established fact or as attributing purpose to a draft bill whose text was not seen.)
  10. 2026-10-10 — Removed the Labour Ministry SSF implementation record from positions; noted the amending Act's date source on the Parliament record; positions_note updated. Party positions kept empty. (Editorial defaults: a repeated item stays only if it adds a distinct fact (the SSF record repeated law_policy and evidence.known); government records kept only where dated and sourced; all-party research not yet done.)
  11. 2026-10-10 — Corrected npc-16th-plan-ch4-strategy locator: the zero-cost item is in section 4.3 (key issues and challenges), not a strategy; added strategy (7) and programmes (4)–(5) pages. Governance locator adds p. 9 (Employment Service Centres). (Locators must point to where the claim is found.)
  12. 2026-10-10 — Nepali text updated to mirror each English change; number conversions (खर्ब/अर्ब/करोड, लाख) rechecked and found exact. (Bilingual fidelity; native review still required.)
  13. 2026-10-10 — Published after independent source-by-source verification. Party positions not yet included (to be added for all House parties together). Nepali text awaiting native review. (Editorial decisions: Option benefits/costs remain editorial reasoning from official sources; independent research to be added. Parliament 2082 amendment record kept (adds the amending Act and date). Census figures shown as reported by the Labour Ministry.)