AvailableNepali translation awaiting review

Governance and justice

Nepal has detailed laws on corruption, public services and the right to information, but in FY 2081/82 the anti-corruption commission handled 37,026 complaints and filed 137 cases, the courts ended the year with 149,560 cases pending, and the Auditor General's backlog of unsettled audit irregularities reached Rs 755 billion.

Long-term goalFair, competent, transparent and corruption-free public administration under the rule of law

The Constitution directs the state to maintain the rule of law and to guarantee good governance by making public administration fair, competent, impartial, transparent, free from corruption, accountable and participatory. It also guarantees a fair trial by an independent court and the right to information. These are standing directions built over many years, not a single reform.4

Urgent problemSlow justice and court decisions that are not carried out

The Supreme Court reports that courts and tribunals disposed of 62.29 per cent of their caseload in FY 2081/82, leaving 149,560 cases pending, and that only 31.56 per cent of the fines owed under court judgments had been recovered. Each pending case is a person or business waiting for a decision.2

Urgent problemAudit irregularities that pile up and repeat

The Auditor General flagged Rs 88.09 billion of new irregularities in the latest audit and reports a cumulative unsettled amount of Rs 755.17 billion, 2.99 per cent more than a year earlier. The Auditor General also says the same kinds of finding keep recurring because past directions are not followed. Irregularities are amounts to be recovered, regularised (including amounts awaiting supporting documents) or advances to be cleared; they are not findings of corruption.3

Contested choiceHow much reach and independence oversight bodies should have, and how to balance openness and speed with privacy and due process

Current law draws lines that reasonable people weigh differently. Under the CIAA Act (in the text consolidated to its 2066 amendment), the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority may not investigate collective policy decisions of the Council of Ministers or its committees; judges' asset declarations are kept confidential; and a public servant charged with corruption is suspended automatically until the case is decided. Widening powers or disclosure may strengthen accountability but raises questions of separation of powers, privacy and the presumption of innocence that the Constitution also protects.71064

Updated 2026-10-11 · Version 2 · Sources · Corrections & right of reply

Question 1

What is the issue, and why does it matter?

Most complaints to the anti-corruption commission end without a court case. In FY 2081/82 the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) registered 28,554 new complaints and carried over 8,472, a total of 37,026. It closed 29,703 (80.22 per cent) after screening or preliminary inquiry, completed 947 detailed investigations, and filed 137 cases in the Special Court against 753 defendants (94 women, 619 men and 40 organisations), claiming Rs 6.02 billion in addition to prison and fines. 7,323 complaints were carried into the next year. A complaint or investigation is not a finding that anyone did wrong; only a court can decide that.1

In FY 2081/82 the Special Court decided 393 cases brought by the CIAA, including cases filed in earlier years. These are first-instance decisions and can be appealed. The offence was established in full in 87 cases and in part in 120 (207 in total, 52.67 per cent). The CIAA appealed 251 decisions to the Supreme Court: 178 in which no offence was established and 73 in which it was established only in part. In the CIAA's own series this share was 38.51 per cent in FY 2078/79, 33.43 per cent in FY 2079/80 and 65.24 per cent in FY 2080/81. The CIAA links the lower shares to a Supreme Court decision of 2078/01/08 that struck down the rule on its sting operations. Because Special Court decisions can be appealed, these are not final outcomes.1

Courts carry a large caseload. In FY 2081/82 the Supreme Court and the courts and tribunals below it had 396,593 cases, writs and applications (162,340 carried over and 234,253 new), disposed of 247,033 (62.29 per cent) and ended the year with 149,560 pending. The Supreme Court alone disposed of 16,634 of 40,741 (40.82 per cent), leaving 24,107; district courts disposed of 166,467 of 268,044 (62.10 per cent). The number of older backlog cases across all courts fell from 17,752 to 12,880.2

Many judgments are not yet fully carried out. Of Rs 46.53 billion in fines that district courts were due to collect, Rs 14.69 billion (31.56 per cent) had been recovered. Of 74,431 applications for execution of judgments in district courts, 36,360 (48.85 per cent) were settled during the year.2

The Auditor General audited Rs 9,484.51 billion of public transactions for FY 2081/82 and flagged Rs 88.09 billion of irregularities (1.84 per cent of the amount audited for government offices, local levels and other bodies). Of these, 41.19 per cent were amounts for which supporting documents had not been submitted and 37.06 per cent were amounts to be recovered. Rs 14.63 billion was recovered during the year, but the cumulative unsettled amount rose to Rs 755.17 billion.3

Governance shapes every other public service: whether a land record, passport or licence arrives on time and without an informal payment, whether public money buys what it was meant to buy, and whether people can get a dispute settled or a wrong put right. Institutions that investigate, audit and judge also need public trust to work, which is why their own speed, openness and fairness matter.

Question 2

What do current law and policy say?

Constitution (rights): every person accused of an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty and has the right to a fair trial by an independent, impartial and competent court, and indigent parties have the right to free legal aid (Article 20). Every citizen has the right to demand and receive information on matters of personal or public interest, except information kept confidential by law (Article 27). Rights can be enforced through the Supreme Court and High Courts (Article 46). State policy includes maintaining the rule of law and guaranteeing good governance through public administration that is fair, competent, impartial, transparent, free from corruption, accountable and participatory (Article 51(b)).4

Constitution (institutions): justice is exercised by the Supreme Court, High Courts (one in each province) and District Courts, and the Supreme Court has final authority to interpret the Constitution and laws (Part 11). The Judicial Council, chaired by the Chief Justice, recommends on appointment, transfer, discipline and dismissal of judges and may investigate and prosecute corruption by judges who are not removable by impeachment (Article 153). The CIAA (Part 21), the Auditor General (Part 22) and the National Human Rights Commission (Part 25) are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council for six-year terms without reappointment. The CIAA investigates abuse of authority through corruption by public office holders and may file cases in court; the Auditor General audits all federal and provincial offices, local levels, courts, constitutional bodies and the security forces; the National Human Rights Commission investigates violations and makes recommendations. Constitutional bodies report every year to the President, and the reports go to the Federal Parliament (Article 294).5

Prevention of Corruption Act, 2059 (first amended in 2081): defines corruption offences including bribery, illegal gain or loss and illegal acquisition of property, and covers government bodies at all three levels, state-owned and state-funded bodies and users' committees. A public servant whose declared property or lifestyle is out of proportion must prove its lawful source, or it is treated as illegally acquired (section 20). Public office holders must submit a declaration of their own and their family's property, with its sources, within 60 days after the end of each fiscal year to a body designated by the government (section 50). A public servant against whom a corruption case is filed is suspended until the case is decided; pay is withheld only if the trial court convicts, and restored if an appeal court acquits (section 33). An informant's name and address must be kept confidential if the informant wishes (section 60), and investigators may reward people who help them (section 58). A National Vigilance Centre under the Prime Minister monitors property declarations and income and carries out checks (sections 37–38).6

Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority Act, 2048 (text consolidated to its 2066 amendment): gives the CIAA powers to order documents, summon and question people and investigate abuse of authority by public office holders. In that text, section 4 says the CIAA will not investigate or take action on proceedings or decisions of meetings of the Constituent Assembly (the legislature at the time of the 2066 amendment) or its committees, or anything a member said or did at such meetings; on collective policy decisions of the Council of Ministers or its committees; or on the judicial work of courts. Section 7 bars action on the use of discretionary powers unless they were used in bad faith or arbitrarily. We could not confirm whether section 4 has been amended since 2066.71

Right to Information Act, 2064: public bodies must publish 13 kinds of information, including services, fees, decision-makers and income and expenditure, and update them every three months. A request must be answered immediately or within 15 days (24 hours where life or safety is at stake). A refused applicant can complain to the head of the body within 7 days and appeal to the National Information Commission within 35 days, which must decide within 60 days. The Commission can fine officials Rs 1,000 to Rs 25,000 for withholding information and Rs 200 a day for delay. Employees have a duty to report corruption or irregularities in their body; the informant's identity must be protected, and anyone punished for reporting can ask the Commission to reverse the action and order compensation (section 29).8

Good Governance (Management and Operation) Act, 2064 (amended in 2081): an official must decide within the time set by law or, where none is set, within seven working days of receiving what is needed, and can be warned by a superior for failing to do so (section 15). Officials must not decide matters in which they have a personal interest (section 18). Every office serving the public must display a citizen charter of services, steps, time limits, officials and fees; the charter is binding and failure can lead to departmental action (section 25). Offices serving the public at provincial, district or local level must hold public hearings (section 30) and keep complaint boxes opened every three days (section 31). The 2081 amendment requires the government to run a citizen app for direct digital access to services, to be linked by federal, provincial and local offices (section 37A). Constitutional bodies, local levels, regulators and public bodies owned or controlled by the government must also apply the Act's main provisions, including those on time limits, conflict of interest, citizen charters and public hearings, with necessary changes (section 36).9

Judicial Council Act, 2073: the Council may set up committees to monitor judges' work and conduct (section 16), appoints a Supreme Court or High Court judge to investigate corruption by High Court or District Court judges with the powers of an investigator under the Prevention of Corruption Act (section 22), and requires members and judges to submit their property declarations within 60 days after each fiscal year; these declarations are kept confidential (section 29).10

Government Decision-Making Process (Simplification and Digitalisation) Regulations, 2083 (published in the Nepal Gazette on 2083/06/12): the government is to run an integrated electronic decision system in all public bodies within six months, with digital files, notes and signatures. Every public body must publish maximum time limits for its services and decisions, and extensions need approval one level up. The government is to apply a decision-delay index for each office, give every applicant a tracking number, and run a service-delivery dashboard in the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers. Officials whose unnecessary delay is confirmed receive lower performance scores.11

16th Plan (FY 2081/82–2085/86): plans a law on conflict of interest, a mechanism to evaluate the integrity of senior officials against indicators, open government, phased moves to fully cashless transactions, more use of technology in investigating and prosecuting corruption, transparency in political parties' finances, a different case management system including in the Supreme Court, wider free legal aid, mediation, and stronger local judicial committees. It also calls for policy arrangements to implement the National Human Rights Commission's recommendations.12

Budget for FY 2083/84 (2026/27): promises a conflict-of-interest law to 'eliminate policy corruption', an integrated information system for recovering and confiscating criminal proceeds, the Hello Sarkar platform for citizen–government dialogue, digital timecards in government offices, use of the national identity card for services such as land revenue, transport, passports and vital registration, adequate resources for constitutional bodies, expansion of the Electronic Court Management System and free legal aid, and dozens more services on the Nagarik App. It also proposes a broad political dialogue on state funding for political parties based on votes, with such grants to be audited by the Auditor General.13

Question 3

What is known, uncertain or disputed?

Known

The number of complaints the CIAA deals with each year has grown: 22,625 in FY 2077/78 (2020/21), 36,186 in FY 2080/81 and 37,026 in FY 2081/82. The Economic Survey table labels these 'complaints received'; for FY 2081/82 the CIAA report shows that the figure includes 8,472 complaints carried over from the year before. Cases filed went from 114 to 201 and then 137. In the Survey's table of complaints by sector, the category 'local level (federal affairs)' was 35.95, 38.91 and 38.23 per cent of complaints in the last three years. The CIAA report uses a different breakdown, by level of government: 53.84 per cent of FY 2081/82 complaints concerned local governments, 33.69 per cent the federal government and 12.47 per cent provincial governments. Complaints about illegal acquisition of property were 6.34 per cent and about fake academic certificates 4.53 per cent. These are complaints, not findings.141

Government complaint channels resolve fewer complaints than they receive. The National Vigilance Centre resolved 75.0 per cent of 1,936 complaints in FY 2081/82 and 51.0 per cent of 1,200 in FY 2082/83 up to mid-March. The Hello Sarkar electronic grievance portal settled 54.6 per cent of 15,886 complaints in FY 2081/82 and 43.9 per cent of 16,421 in FY 2082/83 up to mid-March.14

Right to information appeals are few. The National Information Commission received 1,049 appeals in FY 2081/82 and settled 1,025 (97.71 per cent); 79 came from women. It issued 453 orders to provide information, 23 warnings and 2 orders for action under the penalty section. It received one complaint seeking protection as a whistleblower. The Commission says it cannot compile how many information requests public bodies receive or refuse.15

Many recommendations of oversight bodies are not fully acted on. The National Human Rights Commission's summary report shows that, as of FY 2081/82, 13.29 per cent of its recommendations had been fully implemented, 34.12 per cent partly and 52.60 per cent not at all. The Auditor General reports that directions on implementing audit reports are not followed, so the same findings recur, and that some local governments' accounts committees include executive members, which can let the executive influence their decisions.163

Alternatives to full trials are used much less than planned. The judiciary's strategic plan aimed to send 50 per cent of cases suitable for mediation to mediation and settle half of them, but only 17.20 per cent were sent and 12.32 per cent of those were settled. The Supreme Court also reports that 54 court buildings are old or inadequate, and that about 340,000 of 4,463,327 court records have been scanned into its software.2

Independent perception measure (not a count of corruption): Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2025 gives Nepal 34 out of 100 (0 means highly corrupt, 100 very clean), unchanged from the previous year, ranking it 109th of 182 countries and territories. According to Transparency International, the index ranks countries by perceived levels of public-sector corruption; it does not count actual cases.17

Uncertain

The final outcome of corruption cases is not clear from the reports reviewed. The CIAA's 52.67 per cent figure counts Special Court decisions in which the offence was established fully or partly, and these can be overturned on appeal; the parts of the CIAA report we reviewed do not say how many of these decisions the Supreme Court later upheld or reversed. The CIAA links the lower rates after 2078 to the Supreme Court's ruling on sting operations; we did not test that explanation.1

Official figures differ slightly between documents. For FY 2081/82 CIAA complaints settled, the CIAA annual report gives 29,703 while the Economic Survey table gives 29,706. For new audit irregularities, the Auditor General gives Rs 88.09 billion and the Economic Survey's own table gives Rs 8,809 crore, but its text says Rs 88.911 billion. The 16th Plan's target for the rule of law index is 0.80 in its national targets table and 0.6 in its governance chapter. We use the originating body's figure and show the others here.114312

There is no published national figure, in the sources reviewed, on how many office holders submit property declarations on time, how many are checked, or what the checks find. The law requires annual declarations, the National Vigilance Centre monitors them, and judges' declarations are kept confidential by law.610

Some court and rights statistics lack definitions. The Supreme Court's press summary does not define 'older backlog' (बक्यौता) cases, and the National Human Rights Commission's infographic does not say whether its implementation shares cover all recommendations since the Commission was founded or only recent years. We could not find the Judicial Council's annual report online, so complaints against judges and their outcomes are not reported here.216

Disputed

Nothing recorded yet.

Questions 4–5

What are the options, and what do they cost and achieve?

Options are listed in no particular order. Policy Nepal does not recommend one; real policies often combine them.

Strengthen the independence, capacity and reach of oversight bodies5713161213

Give the CIAA, the Auditor General, the National Human Rights Commission and the National Information Commission secure budgets and specialist staff, require agencies to act on their recommendations within set times, make local accounts committees independent of the executive, and review the limits on what the CIAA may investigate.

Benefits
  • Could reduce repeated audit findings and raise the share of human rights recommendations carried out, which are currently low.
  • Responds to needs the bodies themselves name, such as specialist skills and modern tools for complex corruption cases and mutual legal assistance agreements with other countries.
Costs
  • Needs more public money and skilled staff at a time of tight budgets.
  • Wider investigative reach can make officials more cautious about taking decisions, slowing services and projects.
Trade-offs
  • Extending CIAA review to collective Cabinet policy decisions could strengthen accountability but raises separation-of-powers questions about who should judge policy choices: an investigating body, Parliament or voters.
  • Stronger bodies need stronger checks on themselves, such as transparent appointments through the Constitutional Council, published performance data and judicial review, so that power is not misused.
What implementation needs
  • Carry out the budget promise of adequate resources for constitutional bodies; amend the CIAA Act if the scope is changed; follow the Auditor General's call for independent local accounts committees and an automated system to track Public Accounts Committee directions; and make the policy arrangements the 16th Plan proposes for National Human Rights Commission recommendations.

Open data on budgets, contracts, audit follow-up and asset declarations86103121315

Require public bodies to publish spending, contracts and the status of audit irregularities in open formats, enforce the Right to Information Act's three-monthly disclosure duty, pass the promised conflict-of-interest law, and decide whether some property declarations of senior office holders should be made public.

Benefits
  • Lets journalists, auditors and citizens spot problems early, and reduces the need for individual information requests.
  • Builds on existing duties and plans: proactive disclosure under the Right to Information Act, the 16th Plan's open-government commitment and the budget's conflict-of-interest law.
Costs
  • Publishing reliable data needs systems and staff in thousands of offices, including small local governments.
Trade-offs
  • Publishing asset declarations can deter illegal enrichment but exposes the private details of officials and their families; current law keeps judges' declarations confidential. Options in between include publishing summaries or limiting disclosure to the most senior posts.
  • Raw data without context can be misread, and a published irregularity can be mistaken for proof of wrongdoing when it may only mean missing documents.
What implementation needs
  • Draft and table the conflict-of-interest law; set a common open format for proactive disclosure; have the Auditor General's audit management system publish settlement status by agency; and decide by law what parts of asset declarations, if any, become public and who checks them.

Court management reforms to reduce delay and enforce judgments251213

Expand differentiated case management, electronic court systems and mediation; review jurisdiction so that most cases end at the High Court; and give clearer responsibility for collecting fines and carrying out judgments.

Benefits
  • Faster decisions for the 149,560 cases pending at the end of FY 2081/82, and more mediated settlements, which the judiciary's own plan expected to be far higher.
  • Better collection of fines and execution of judgments would make court decisions matter in practice.
Costs
  • Needs judges and staff, court buildings (54 are reported old or inadequate), scanners and connectivity, and budget for mediators.
Trade-offs
  • Limiting appeals to the Supreme Court speeds up final decisions but reduces a second chance for parties who believe a lower court erred.
  • Pressure to dispose of cases quickly can affect the quality of judgments; output targets for judgment writing need quality safeguards.
What implementation needs
  • Act on the Supreme Court's suggestions (jurisdiction review, a separate law on judicial service conditions under the Constitution, giving federal, provincial and local governments roles in recovering fines, and enforcing the law on seizing criminal proceeds); fund the Electronic Court Management System and free legal aid as the budget promises; and pursue the 16th Plan's different case management and mediation programmes.

Administrative simplification and digital public services119141312

Put published time limits, tracking numbers and digital files at the centre of service delivery, as the 2083 Regulations require; link services through the Nagarik App and national identity card; and use complaint data from Hello Sarkar and citizen charters to fix slow offices.

Benefits
  • Fewer face-to-face steps may reduce chances for informal payments and delays, and create a record of who held up a file.
  • Builds on laws and systems already adopted: the Good Governance Act's time limits and citizen app, the 2083 Regulations and the Hello Sarkar portal.
Costs
  • Software, connectivity, cyber security and training for federal, provincial and local offices; the Regulations allow paper processes to continue where digital systems are not yet in place.
Trade-offs
  • Digital-first services can leave behind people without phones, internet or digital skills, and linking records to the national identity card raises privacy and data-security questions.
  • Measuring officials by speed can push quick but poor decisions unless quality and complaints are also counted.
What implementation needs
  • Meet the six-month deadline in the 2083 Regulations for an integrated electronic decision system; publish each office's time limits and its decision-delay index; keep assisted, in-person options for those who need them; and let provinces and local governments build or join the systems as the Regulations allow.

Stronger protection for whistleblowers and enforcement of the right to information86151

Make it safer and more worthwhile to report wrongdoing, through clearer protection, safe reporting channels and follow-up, and make public bodies answer information requests on time, with the National Information Commission using its penalty powers and collecting data on requests.

Benefits
  • Insiders may learn of problems early; protection could bring better-quality complaints, which the CIAA says it lacks.
  • Information requests answered on time help people check services and spending themselves.
Costs
  • Handling reports and appeals properly needs staff and offices outside Kathmandu Valley, where the Information Commission is based.
Trade-offs
  • Protection and confidentiality can be misused for false or malicious complaints; the Prevention of Corruption Act already penalises false complaints, and a balance is needed so that honest reporting is not discouraged.
  • Wider disclosure can conflict with privacy and with information the law keeps confidential.
What implementation needs
  • Review whether protections in section 29 of the Right to Information Act and section 60 of the Prevention of Corruption Act are enough or a separate law is needed (none was found in the sources reviewed); require public bodies to report numbers of requests, refusals and response times; and resource the Information Commission, whose role the Act sets out.

Combining options

These options can be combined, and official plans already mix them: the 16th Plan pairs digital services and case management with integrity checks and a conflict-of-interest law, and the FY 2083/84 budget combines more resources for constitutional bodies with electronic courts and digital service platforms. The main choices are about order and balance: whether to widen oversight powers before or after improving the speed and openness of the bodies that use them, how much personal information to disclose in the name of accountability, and how to make sure faster services and courts do not come at the cost of quality, privacy or the presumption of innocence. Open data and right-to-information enforcement support every other option, because they let people see whether the reforms are working.

Question 6

Who is responsible?

Independent body
Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA)

Constitutional body that receives complaints, investigates abuse of authority through corruption by public office holders at all three levels and files cases in the Special Court; it also makes preventive recommendations to public bodies. It has offices outside Kathmandu and has delegated some investigation powers to Chief District Officers in 33 districts.51

Independent body
Office of the Auditor General

Audits federal and provincial offices, local levels, courts, constitutional bodies and the security forces, records audit irregularities and reports each year to the President, with reports placed before the Federal Parliament and provincial assemblies.53

Independent body
Supreme Court, High Courts, District Courts and the Special Court

Decide cases, including corruption cases (first heard in the Special Court, with appeal to the Supreme Court), enforce fundamental rights and oversee execution of judgments. The Chief Justice has ultimate responsibility for the administration of justice.512

Independent body
Judicial Council

Recommends appointment, transfer, discipline and dismissal of judges, monitors judges' conduct, investigates corruption by judges other than those removable by impeachment, and keeps judges' property declarations.510

Independent body
National Human Rights Commission

Investigates human rights violations, recommends action against those responsible, reviews laws, and may publish the names of officials or bodies that fail to implement its recommendations.516

Independent body
National Information Commission

Statutory commission under the Right to Information Act that hears appeals when information is refused, orders disclosure, fines officials for withholding or delaying information, and protects whistleblowers who are punished for reporting.815

Federal
Government of Nepal (Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, National Vigilance Centre and ministries)

Runs public administration and service delivery, the Hello Sarkar grievance portal and the service-delivery dashboard; the National Vigilance Centre monitors property declarations and handles complaints; ministries must act on audit findings and settle irregularities.611143

Federal
Federal Parliament

Makes and amends the laws on corruption, courts, information and administration; receives the annual reports of the courts, Judicial Council and constitutional bodies; and its Public Accounts Committee examines the Auditor General's reports and gives directions.53

Provincial
Provincial governments

Run provincial offices that are audited by the Auditor General and subject to CIAA complaints (12.47 per cent of complaints in FY 2081/82); provincial assemblies discuss the Auditor General's provincial reports; provinces may build their own digital decision systems under the 2083 Regulations.1311

Local
Local governments (rural municipalities and municipalities)

Deliver many everyday services and are the subject of the largest share of CIAA complaints (53.84 per cent in FY 2081/82); must follow the Good Governance Act; their judicial committees, led by the deputy mayor or vice-chair, settle local disputes; their assemblies discuss audit reports.5193

Question 7

What have parties and leaders said and done?

What was said or promised is shown apart from what was recorded as done. Every entry needs a dated source. A missing entry means the position is not established, not that someone opposes or is neutral.

Party positions on governance and justice are still being researched. To keep coverage fair, they will be added for every party with seats in the House of Representatives at the same time, each from that party's own documents. The records above are government and official records (a budget, a regulation, laws and the reported results of oversight bodies and the courts) and do not represent any party.

Said or promised

Stated position · 2026 (budget speech for FY 2083/84, 2026/27)

Government of Nepal (Ministry of Finance)

The FY 2083/84 budget commits to a conflict-of-interest law, an integrated system for recovering criminal proceeds, the Hello Sarkar platform, digital timecards, national identity card-based services, adequate resources for constitutional bodies, an expanded Electronic Court Management System and free legal aid, and a political dialogue on state funding for parties audited by the Auditor General.13

Recorded actions and outcomes

Implementation · 2083/06/12 (Nepal Gazette publication)

Government of Nepal (Council of Ministers)

The Council of Ministers made the Government Decision-Making Process (Simplification and Digitalisation) Regulations, 2083, published in the Nepal Gazette on 2083/06/12. They require an integrated electronic decision system in all public bodies within six months, published time limits, tracking numbers and a decision-delay index, and repeal the 2065 directive on simplifying government decisions.11

Implementation · 2081/12/03 and 2081/12/18 (authentication dates as listed by the Law Commission)

Federal Parliament

The Prevention of Corruption (First Amendment) Act, 2081 was authenticated on 2081/12/03, and the Act amending some Nepal Acts on promoting good governance and public service delivery, 2081, which amended the Good Governance Act (including decision deadlines and the citizen app), was authenticated on 2081/12/18.69

Outcome · 2082/06/05 (report forwarded to the President; covers FY 2081/82)

Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA)

The CIAA's 35th annual report (FY 2081/82) records 37,026 complaints, 29,703 closed after screening or preliminary inquiry, 947 detailed investigations completed, 137 cases filed in the Special Court, 393 Special Court decisions received with the offence established fully or partly in 207, and 251 appeals to the Supreme Court. It also lists 691 recommendations to public bodies arising from complaints.1

Outcome · 2083 (63rd annual report, covering FY 2081/82)

Office of the Auditor General

The 63rd annual report (audit of FY 2081/82) audited 5,526 offices and bodies, flagged Rs 88.09 billion in new irregularities, recorded Rs 14.63 billion recovered and put the cumulative unsettled amount at Rs 755.17 billion.3

Outcome · 2082/12/11 (annual report presented; covers FY 2081/82)

Supreme Court of Nepal

The Supreme Court's annual report for FY 2081/82, presented to the President on 2082/12/11, reports 247,033 of 396,593 cases disposed across all courts and tribunals (62.29 per cent), 8.43 per cent more than the year before, with 149,560 pending and older backlog cases down by 27.44 per cent.2

Question 8

What would progress look like, and when do we check again?

IndicatorLatest official figureOfficial targetRevisit
Share of the courts' annual caseload that is disposed of212 62.29 per cent across all courts and tribunals in FY 2081/82 (149,560 cases pending). The 16th Plan gives 64 per cent for FY 2079/80 (64.4 per cent in its governance chapter) but does not say how it calculates the figure, so the two may not be directly comparable. (FY 2081/82 (2024/25))212 75 per cent of cases registered in court settled (FY 2085/86 (2028/29))12 2027-04, after the Supreme Court's annual report for FY 2082/83
Cumulative unsettled audit irregularities (beruju)312 Rs 755.17 billion, up 2.99 per cent on the year before (Auditor General's 63rd report (audit of FY 2081/82))3 Irregularities 'as a proportion of GDP' cut from 10.9 per cent (FY 2079/80) to 5.0 per cent, as stated in the Plan's national good-governance targets table. The Plan does not explain the basis of this indicator: it does not say whether it means the annual or the cumulative amount, or how it is calculated. It is also in a different unit from the baseline shown here (rupees). (FY 2085/86 (2028/29))12 2027-06, or the Auditor General's 64th annual report
Special Court first-instance decisions on CIAA cases (count and share where the offence was established). This is a descriptive count, not a performance target, and every decision is subject to appeal.1 393 decisions in FY 2081/82; offence established fully in 87 and partly in 120 (207, or 52.67 per cent). The CIAA appealed 251 decisions; outcomes on appeal are not reported in the sources reviewed. (FY 2081/82 (2024/25))1 No official target found 2027-10, after the CIAA's 36th annual report (descriptive indicator; no official target, and none should be inferred)
National Human Rights Commission recommendations fully implemented1612 13.29 per cent fully, 34.12 per cent partly, 52.60 per cent not implemented (FY 2081/82 (2024/25))16 No official target found 2027-01, after the Commission's annual report for FY 2082/83 (no official target found in the documents reviewed)
Corruption Perceptions Index score (Transparency International; a perception index, not a count of corruption)1712 34 out of 100 in CPI 2025 (rank 109 of 182). The 16th Plan uses 35 as its FY 2079/80 baseline. (CPI 2025 (published 2026))1712 43 (FY 2085/86 (2028/29))12 2027-02, when CPI 2026 is published

Sources

Grouped by type of evidence. Government plans show what government intends; they are not proof of results. Party material shows what a party says.

Constitution & law

  1. The Constitution of Nepal (English translation, incl. first and second amendments) — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Gazette publication 20 September 2015; amended 2016 and 2020. Article 20 (rights relating to justice: clauses 5, 9, 10), pp. 11–12; Article 27 (right to information), p. 15; Article 46 (constitutional remedies), p. 20; Article 51(b)(2) and (4) (rule of law; good governance), pp. 23–24. Checked 2026-10-10
  2. The Constitution of Nepal (English translation, incl. first and second amendments) — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Gazette publication 20 September 2015; amended 2016 and 2020. Part 11: Articles 126–128 (courts, Supreme Court), p. 67; Articles 136–138 (Chief Justice, Constitutional Bench, annual reports), pp. 71–72; Article 139 (a High Court in each province), p. 72; Article 153 (Judicial Council), pp. 79–80; Article 217 (local judicial committees), p. 112; Part 21, Articles 238–239 (CIAA), pp. 122–124; Part 22, Articles 240–241 (Auditor General), pp. 125–127; Part 25, Articles 248–249 (National Human Rights Commission), pp. 136–139; Article 294 (annual reports of constitutional bodies), p. 172. Checked 2026-10-10
  3. भ्रष्टाचार निवारण ऐन, २०५९ (Prevention of Corruption Act, 2059), consolidated Nepali text including the First Amendment, 2081 — Nepal Law Commission (consolidated text), hosted by the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, Royal seal 2059/03/05; amended 2066 and by the Prevention of Corruption (First Amendment) Act, 2081 (authenticated 2081/12/03), as listed on the title page. Title page, p. 1; section 2(ग)–(घ) (public institutions, incl. users' committees; public servants), pp. 2–3; section 20 (illegal acquisition of property), p. 18; section 33 (automatic suspension), pp. 26–27; sections 37–38 (National Vigilance Centre), pp. 28–29; section 47 (confiscation), pp. 32–33; section 49 (false complaints), p. 34; section 50 (property declarations), pp. 34–35; section 58 (reward), p. 39; section 60 (informant's name and address kept confidential if the informant wishes), p. 40. Checked 2026-10-10
  4. अख्तियार दुरुपयोग अनुसन्धान आयोग ऐन, २०४८ (Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority Act, 2048), consolidated Nepali text — Nepal Law Commission (consolidated text), hosted by the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, Authenticated 2048/08/14; amending Acts listed on the title page up to the Republic Strengthening and Some Nepal Laws Amendment Act, 2066. Title page (authenticated 2048/08/14; amending Acts to 2066/10/07), p. 1; section 4 (jurisdiction), p. 4, and proviso (ख) (Constituent Assembly or its committees; collective policy decisions of the Council of Ministers or its committees; judicial work of courts), p. 5; section 7 (discretionary powers), p. 5. Checked 2026-10-10
  5. सूचनाको हकसम्बन्धी ऐन, २०६४ (Right to Information Act, 2064), consolidated Nepali text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Authenticated 2064/04/05; amended 2072 and 2075. Section 3 (right to information), p. 3; section 5(3)–(4) (proactive disclosure every three months), p. 5; section 7 (15 days; 24 hours), p. 6; section 9 (complaint to head within 7 days), p. 7; section 10 (appeal to Commission within 35 days; decision within 60 days), p. 8; section 11 (Commission), p. 8; section 21 (central office in Kathmandu Valley), p. 11; section 25 (annual report), p. 12; section 29 (protection of whistleblowers), p. 13; section 32 (penalties), pp. 14–15. Checked 2026-10-10
  6. सुशासन (व्यवस्थापन तथा सञ्चालन) ऐन, २०६४ (Good Governance (Management and Operation) Act, 2064), consolidated Nepali text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Authenticated 2064/10/23; amended 2072, 2075 and by the Act amending some Nepal Acts on promoting good governance and public service delivery, 2081 (2081/12/18), as listed on the title page. Title page, p. 1; section 15 (decision within set time or seven working days; warnings), pp. 11–12; section 18 (conflict of interest), pp. 13–14; section 25 (citizen charter), pp. 19–20; section 30 (public hearing) and section 31 (grievance management), pp. 21–22; section 36 (application to constitutional bodies, local levels and public bodies), p. 23; section 37A (citizen app), p. 23. Checked 2026-10-10
  7. न्याय परिषद् ऐन, २०७३ (Judicial Council Act, 2073), consolidated Nepali text — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, Authenticated 2073/05/27; amended by the Act amending some Nepal Acts, 2082 (2082/04/14). Section 16 (monitoring committees), p. 12; section 22 (corruption investigation and prosecution), pp. 15–16; section 29 (property declarations, confidential), p. 18. Checked 2026-10-10
  8. सरकारी निर्णय प्रक्रिया (सरलीकरण तथा डिजिटल बनाउने) सम्बन्धी नियमावली, २०८३ (Government Decision-Making Process (Simplification and Digitalisation) Regulations, 2083) — Nepal Law Commission (Government of Nepal, Council of Ministers), Published in the Nepal Gazette 2083/06/12 (Regulations no. 39 of 2083); made under section 2 of the Administrative Procedure (Regulation) Act, 2013. Rule 15 (integrated electronic decision system within six months; paper processes allowed until rolled out), pp. 10–11; rules 26–27 (time limits; counting decision time), pp. 14–15; rules 32–33 (decision-delay index; accountability), pp. 16–17; rules 34–35 (tracking number; service-delivery dashboard), p. 17; rule 44 (provinces and local levels), p. 20; rule 51 (repeal of the 2065 directive), p. 21. Checked 2026-10-10

Government plans & policy

  1. The Sixteenth Plan (Fiscal Year 2024/25 – 2028/29) — English (unofficial translation) — National Planning Commission, Government of Nepal, 2024. Section 1.6.1 'National Targets of Good Governance' (rule of law index 0.52→0.80; CPI 35→43; settlement of cases registered in court 64%→75%; irregularities as a proportion of GDP 10.9%→5.0%), p. 13 (PDF p. 25); chapter 12 'Governance Reforms and Promotion of Good Governance': 12.2 existing situation, pp. 191–192; 12.3 issues, pp. 193–194; 12.4 strategies 6–7, 10, 12, pp. 196–197; 12.5 programmes 2–3, 6–7, 12, pp. 198–201; 12.6 quantitative targets (rule of law index 0.52→0.6; 'Corruption Control Perception Index' 35→43; total legal case settlement (annual) 64.4%→75%), pp. 201–202. Checked 2026-10-10
  2. Budget Speech for Fiscal Year 2026/27 (2083/84), English unofficial translation — Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal, 2026 (presented to the joint meeting of the Federal Parliament). Paragraph 17 (Nagarik App), p. 8; paragraph 38 (state funding for parties; Auditor General audit), p. 17; paragraph 61 'Good Governance', clauses (a)–(e) and (g), pp. 40–41; paragraph 62 'Rule of Law and National Security', clause (a), p. 41. Checked 2026-10-10

Official data

  1. अख्तियार दुरुपयोग अनुसन्धान आयोगको पैँतिसौँ वार्षिक प्रतिवेदन, आर्थिक वर्ष २०८१/८२ (CIAA 35th Annual Report, FY 2081/82) — Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), Nepal, 2082 (letter forwarding the report to the President dated 2082/06/05); listed at https://www.ciaa.gov.np/singlePublications/219. Report summary (प्रतिवेदनको सारांश), paras 2–4 and 6–18 and 22, printed pp. क–च (PDF pp. 12–17); section 1.3 (laws governing the Commission), p. 4 (PDF p. 21); section 3.9, Table 3.12 (Special Court conviction rate FY 2059/60–2081/82), pp. 289–290 (PDF pp. 306–307). Checked 2026-10-10
  2. सर्वोच्च अदालतको आर्थिक वर्ष २०८१/०८२ को वार्षिक प्रतिवेदनका सम्बन्धमा प्रेस विज्ञप्ति (Press release on the Supreme Court's annual report for FY 2081/82) — Supreme Court of Nepal, 2082/12/11 (listed at https://supremecourt.gov.np/web/annualreport). Section 1 (case disposal: all courts, Supreme Court, High Courts, District Courts, other courts and tribunals), pp. 1–2; section 2 (execution of judgments: imprisonment, fines, execution applications), pp. 2–3; sections 5–6 (records; budget), p. 3; problems and suggestions (workload, jurisdiction review, Article 155 law, mediation targets, records, buildings, execution), pp. 4–9. Checked 2026-10-10
  3. महालेखापरीक्षकको त्रिसट्ठिऔं वार्षिक प्रतिवेदन, सारांश-२०८३ (Auditor General's 63rd Annual Report, Summary 2083) — Office of the Auditor General, Nepal, 2083 BS / 2026 (audit of FY 2081/82). Chapter 1 (bodies audited; Rs 94 kharba 84 arba 50 crore audited), p. 5; chapter 2 'बेरुजु स्थिति', paras 1–5 and tables (definition and classification; Rs 8,80,911 lakh new irregularities by type and level; Rs 94,84,50,98 lakh audited, para 2 and para 5.1; cumulative Rs 75,51,722 lakh, +2.99%; recoveries Rs 14 arba 63 crore 26 lakh 99 thousand, para 5.7), pp. 9–11; chapter 4 (implementation: recurring findings, para 5; local accounts committees, para 4; recoveries table, para 7; reports to the House and provincial assemblies and the call for an automated system to track Public Accounts Committee directions, para 8), pp. 51–54. Checked 2026-10-10
  4. Economic Survey 2025/26 (English) — Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal, 2026. Chapter 12 'Good Governance and Administration', paras 12.4–12.10 and Tables 12(a) (CIAA complaints and cases, FY 2020/21–2025/26), 12(b) (complaints by sector) and 12(c) (audit irregularities), pp. 179–181. Checked 2026-10-10
  5. राष्ट्रिय सूचना आयोगको वार्षिक प्रतिवेदन, २०८१/८२ (National Information Commission Annual Report, FY 2081/82) — National Information Commission, Nepal, 2082 (listed at https://www.nic.gov.np/category/annual-report/). Section 3.1.2 'पुनरावेदन' and Table 2 (appeals and orders; appeals by year FY 2065/66–2081/82), p. 20 (PDF p. 35); section 3.3 and Table 4 (complaints incl. whistleblower protection) and section 3.4, Table 5 (appeals by province and gender), p. 23 (PDF p. 38). Checked 2026-10-10
  6. राष्ट्रिय मानव अधिकार आयोग वार्षिक प्रतिवेदन संक्षिप्त २०८१-०८२ (Infographic summary of the NHRC Annual Report, FY 2081/82) — National Human Rights Commission, Nepal, 2082 (listed at https://www.nhrcnepal.org/publication/reports). PDF p. 11, chart 'सिफारिस कार्यान्वयनको अवस्था आ.व. २०७९/०८० देखि आ.व. २०८१/०८२ सम्मको अवस्था' (fully implemented 15.30% / 13.66% / 13.29%; partly 39.20% / 35.09% / 34.12%; not implemented 45.50% / 51.23% / 52.60% for FY 2079/80, 2080/81, 2081/82). Checked 2026-10-10

Independent research

  1. Nepal — Corruption Perceptions Index country page — Transparency International, CPI 2025 (released 2026). Country page summary: 'Nepal has a score of 34 this year, with a change of 0 since last year, meaning it ranks 109 out of 182 countries'; scale 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) per the CPI 2025 index page (https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2025/index/npl); description of the index from https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2025. Checked 2026-10-10

Corrections & right of reply

Parties, leaders and readers may ask us to correct an error or add a documented response. Corrections are published visibly with the date and reason; no one can pay to change coverage.

The submission channel is not open yet. It will open once an editorial contact and review process are in place.

Change history
  1. 2026-10-10 — First researched draft of the governance and justice issue page (status: review). (New topic page for the National Agenda; all figures taken from sources opened on 2026-10-10. No individuals or local governments are named in connection with complaints or cases. Complaints, investigations, charges filed and court outcomes are kept distinct, and Special Court outcomes are described as first-instance. Party positions intentionally not included pending all-party research. Conflicting official figures (CIAA complaints settled; new audit irregularities; 16th Plan rule of law target) are shown, not reconciled; unreconciled Supreme Court imprisonment figures are excluded.)
  2. 2026-10-10 — Classification (audit irregularities): definition now includes outstanding advances alongside amounts to be recovered or regularised. (OAG 63rd summary ch. 2 para 1 (p. 9) classifies बेरुजु as recoverable, to be regularised, and advances (पेस्की, 5.88 per cent of the new total); the earlier wording omitted advances.)
  3. 2026-10-10 — Why (Special Court decisions): added the FY 2080/81 share (65.24 per cent), split the 251 appeals into 178 with no offence established and 73 partly established, and stated up front that these are appealable first-instance decisions. (CIAA 35th report Table 3.12 (p. 290) gives 152 of 233 (65.24 per cent) for FY 2080/81, which the earlier text omitted and which changes the picture of the trend; summary para 17 (p. घ) gives the 178 + 73 breakdown.)
  4. 2026-10-10 — Why (execution of judgments): 'Judgments are often not carried out' changed to 'Many judgments are not yet fully carried out'. (The Supreme Court figures are a cumulative backlog of fines and applications; the softer wording matches what the figures show.)
  5. 2026-10-10 — Law (Prevention of Corruption Act s. 60): informant confidentiality changed from 'may be kept confidential' to 'must be kept confidential if the informant wishes', and now covers address as well as name. (PCA s. 60 (p. 40) says the informant's name and address 'shall be kept confidential' if the informant so wishes (राखिनेछ), not 'may'.)
  6. 2026-10-10 — Law (CIAA Act s. 4): 'decisions of Parliament or its committees' corrected to the actual wording of the cited text: proceedings or decisions of meetings of the Constituent Assembly or its committees, and anything a member said or did there. The item now says the text is consolidated to the 2066 amendment and that current wording is unconfirmed. (Rendered p. 5 of the CIAA-hosted Law Commission PDF: s. 4(ख), as amended in 2066, says संविधान सभा वा समितिको बैठक. On 2026-10-10 one search for a newer consolidated text on lawcommission.gov.np found only the CIAA Regulations, 2059, so the current wording could not be confirmed.)
  7. 2026-10-10 — Law (Good Governance Act s. 30): public hearings now attributed to offices serving the public at provincial, district or local level, not to all offices. (GGMA s. 30(1) (p. 21) applies to offices at provincial, district or local level.)
  8. 2026-10-10 — Law (Judicial Council Act s. 22): 'may appoint' changed to 'appoints' a judge as investigator. (JC Act s. 22(1) (p. 15) says the Council तोक्नेछ (shall appoint).)
  9. 2026-10-10 — Evidence (CIAA complaint trend): reworded. The series is now described as complaints 'dealt with', and the item notes that the FY 2081/82 figure includes 8,472 carried-over complaints. The Survey's sector category 'local level (federal affairs)', 38.23 per cent, is now kept separate from the CIAA's level-of-government share, 53.84 per cent. The item now says these are complaints, not findings. (ES Table 12(a) (p. 180) labels 37,026 as 'received', but the CIAA summary para 6 shows it is 28,554 new plus 8,472 carried over. The old text said 'more than a third of complaints concerned local governments (38.23%)' alongside '53.84% concerned local governments', and those two statements contradicted each other: they come from different classifications (ES Table 12(b) sector table vs CIAA para 7).)
  10. 2026-10-10 — Evidence (information appeals): '700 of them' clarified as '700 of the appeals'. (NIC Table 5 (p. 23) gives 700 of 1,049 appeals received, not 700 of the 1,025 settled; the earlier wording was ambiguous.)
  11. 2026-10-10 — Evidence (CPI): 'measures expert and business perceptions' replaced with TI's own description: it ranks countries by perceived levels of public-sector corruption. (The TI pages opened (country page, CPI 2025 index and CPI 2025 pages) do not say whose perceptions the index draws on, so the specific claim was unsupported.)
  12. 2026-10-10 — Options: two benefit statements softened ('reduce' to 'may reduce'; 'Insiders often know of problems first' to 'Insiders may learn of problems early'). (Uncited general claims are now worded as possibilities so that no option is presented as proven.)
  13. 2026-10-10 — Progress (court disposal): added that the 16th Plan does not say how its 64 per cent baseline is calculated (its chapter 12 gives 64.4), so it may not be directly comparable with the Supreme Court's 62.29 per cent. (16th Plan p. 13 and Table 12.6 #19 (p. 202) give the figure without a definition.)
  14. 2026-10-10 — Progress (audit irregularities): editorial decision (b). The 16th Plan target is kept, because the national targets table (p. 13) states it unambiguously as 'Irregularities (as a proportion of GDP)', 10.9 to 5.0 per cent. A note now says its basis is not explained and its unit differs from the rupee baseline. The locator is corrected from p. 11 to p. 13. (Re-read the 16th Plan English text (FAOLEX PDF p. 25, printed p. 13): the figure and label are explicit, but no definition is given anywhere in chapter 12, and the indicator is not repeated in Table 12.6.)
  15. 2026-10-10 — Progress (Special Court decisions): editorial decision (a). The indicator is reframed as 'Special Court first-instance decisions on CIAA cases (count and share where the offence was established)'. It now carries an explicit note that it is a descriptive count, not a performance target, and subject to appeal. The baseline gives the count (393; 87 full, 120 partial; 207) as well as the share. It is kept because every figure matches the source exactly. (CIAA 35th report summary para 16 and Table 3.12 (p. 290) give 393 / 207 / 52.67 per cent exactly. Presenting a rate alone risked being read as a conviction target.)
  16. 2026-10-10 — Source gj-npc16-gov: locator for the national targets table corrected from p. 11 to p. 13 (PDF p. 25). Notes now explain that the page offset differs by section and that the GDP-irregularities indicator is not defined. (The printed header on PDF p. 25 reads 'Introduction | 13'. The '−14' offset holds only for chapter 12.)
  17. 2026-10-10 — Source gj-const-bodies: Arts 248–249 locator extended to pp. 136–139. (Article 249(2)(h), the power to publish names, is on p. 139.)
  18. 2026-10-10 — Source gj-oag63-beruju: locator made more precise. The amount audited to the lakh is in ch. 2 (pp. 9–10), not ch. 1, and the recoveries appear in ch. 2 para 5.7 (p. 11) as well as ch. 4 para 7 (p. 53). (Checked against the summary PDF.)
  19. 2026-10-10 — Source gj-ciaa-act: notes and locator now say the text is consolidated to the 2066 amendment and that proviso (ख) refers to the Constituent Assembly. The notes also record the single unsuccessful attempt to find a current consolidated text. (Editorial decision (c).)
  20. 2026-10-10 — Independent verification pass (version bumped to 2). Every figure, date and legal provision was re-checked against freshly downloaded sources. Items not listed above were verified unchanged. (Fact-check and fairness review before owner sign-off. Status stays 'review' and ne_status stays 'draft-needs-native-review'. Details are in research-notes/governance-justice.md, under 'Verification (2026-10-10)'.)
  21. 2026-10-11 — Removed the provincial breakdown of right-to-information appeals (Conservative default: do not single out a province)
  22. 2026-10-11 — Published after independent source-by-source verification. Owner waived the separate sign-off review; conservative editorial defaults applied. Party positions not yet included (to be added for all House parties together). Nepali text awaiting native review. (Editorial decisions: No individuals, offices or local governments named; Special Court figures shown as a descriptive, appealable count; CIAA Act s.4 cited as consolidated to 2066 with current wording unconfirmed.)