Laws · Analysis

'Improper conduct': the CIAA Act still provides for it, while the 2015 Constitution describes the CIAA's investigation power in terms of abuse of authority through corruption

Unclear wordingMedium confidenceEnacted ActBill (not law)Reform recommendation

Article 239(1) of the Constitution of Nepal lets the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) investigate a public office holder's abuse of authority 'by committing corruption'. The CIAA Act 2048, written under the 1990 Constitution, still defines 'improper conduct' (s.3) as a form of abuse of authority and sets out complaint and departmental-action procedures for it (ss.8–12ग). The CIAA's own report describes the change between the two constitutions, and the National Vigilance Centre says the legal basis for dealing with improper conduct is still not adequate or clear. Whether, and how far, the CIAA may still act on improper conduct that is not corruption appears unsettled.

Laws and sections involved

नेपालको संविधान · Constitution of Nepal Art. 239(1), 239(4), 239(6)
Our translation of Art. 239(1): the CIAA may, in accordance with law, investigate or cause to be investigated the abuse of authority by a person holding public office 'by committing corruption'. Art. 239(4): if an investigation shows that the conduct falls within the jurisdiction of another official or body, the CIAA may write to that official or body for necessary action. Art. 239(6): the CIAA's other functions, duties, powers and procedure are as provided by federal law.
Law Commission Nepali text as amended by the First Amendment (2072/11/16) and Second Amendment (2077/03/04). Art. 239 on PDF pp.114–115. An official English translation is also published by the Law Commission. Official text
अख्तियार दुरूपयोग अनुसन्धान आयोग ऐन, २०४८ · Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority Act, 1991 s.2(छ), 2(झ), s.3, s.4, ss.8–12ग
Our paraphrase: s.2(झ) defines 'abuse of authority' as improper conduct or corruption. s.3 lists improper conduct (for example refusing to do work within one's authority, not following mandatory procedure, using discretion in bad faith or arbitrarily, not performing official duties). Chapter 3 (ss.8–12ग) lets anyone complain about improper conduct, lets the CIAA seek an explanation, warn the person or write to the appointing authority for departmental punishment within three months, and order action to recover loss or correct the consequences.
Law Commission consolidated text (royal seal 2048/8/4; Act No. 33 of 2048); the title page lists five amending Acts, the latest the Act Amending Some Nepal Acts 2072 (2072/11/13), which revised the s.4 proviso to refer to Art. 239(1) of the Constitution. The definitions and Chapter 3 on improper conduct remain in the text. The CIAA reports that an amendment bill has long been pending in Parliament; its content was not opened. Official text

The apparent issue

The Act's machinery for improper conduct predates the 2015 Constitution. Article 239(1) frames the CIAA's investigation power around abuse of authority through corruption, Article 239(4) provides for referring matters within another body's jurisdiction, and Article 239(6) leaves 'other functions' to federal law. It is not clear whether the Act's improper-conduct provisions remain a valid 'other function' under Article 239(6), whether they survive only as a referral power under Article 239(4), or whether they are no longer usable. The overlap with the National Vigilance Centre and departmental authorities adds to the uncertainty.

Evidence

The CIAA's 35th Annual Report explains that under the 1990 Constitution the CIAA could investigate abuse of authority through improper conduct or corruption, warn offenders or write for departmental action in cases of improper conduct, and prosecute corruption; it then describes its role under Part 21 of the current Constitution as investigating abuse of authority through corruption and filing cases in court. Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority Chapter 1, §1.1 Background, printed p.1 (PDF p.18)
Among its recommendations on governance reform, the CIAA asks bodies to which it has written about complaints of improper conduct falling within their own jurisdiction to address them in time — that is, the CIAA describes forwarding such complaints rather than deciding them. Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority §5.3.1(ख), item 8, printed p.333 (PDF p.350)
The CIAA reports that its head told a National Assembly committee (2082/01/24) that an amendment bill to the CIAA Act had long been under consideration in Parliament, and the report repeats its recommendation to amend the CIAA Act 2048 in a timely way. Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority §4.2.2, printed p.305 (PDF p.322); §5.3.1(क)(2), printed p.331 (PDF p.348)
The National Vigilance Centre lists as its first problem and challenge that the legal arrangements needed to make corruption control and the investigation of and action on improper conduct more effective are 'still not adequate and clear', and separately notes duplication of jurisdiction when similar inquiries are done by different bodies. National Vigilance Centre §4.2(क) and (ङ), printed p.120 (PDF p.136)
A paper by a CIAA official published in UNAFEI's Resource Material Series states that the new Constitution did not give the CIAA power to investigate improper conduct. It is a personal paper, not an official CIAA position. UNAFEI §VI.D, printed p.180
The text of Art. 239 and of ss.2–4 and 8–12ग of the CIAA Act was read in the Law Commission's Nepali texts. Nepal Law Commission Constitution PDF pp.114–115; CIAA Act PDF pp.4–10

Possible readings

Reading 1: Article 239(1) defines the CIAA's investigation power exhaustively as abuse of authority through corruption, so the Act's improper-conduct procedure no longer has a constitutional basis; the CIAA may at most refer such matters under Article 239(4).
Reading 2: Article 239(6) lets federal law give the CIAA 'other functions', and the Act (as amended in 2072, after the Constitution) kept the improper-conduct chapter, so the CIAA may still receive complaints and recommend departmental action, though not prosecute.
Reading 3: the provisions remain on the statute book until amended or struck down by a court, but in practice the CIAA treats non-corruption complaints as referrals, which is consistent with both Article 239(4) and the Act; the practical question is then about follow-up by the receiving bodies rather than jurisdiction.

Why it matters in practice

If the scope is unclear, complainants may not know where to go with misconduct that is not corruption; officials receiving CIAA letters may question whether they must act within three months under s.12; and departmental actions based on CIAA referrals could be challenged. Overlap with the National Vigilance Centre and departmental authorities could lead to duplicate or missing inquiries.

Hypothetical example

Hypothetical: a land office chief repeatedly refuses, without reason, to register transfers within his authority, but no bribe is alleged. A resident complains to the CIAA. Under one reading the CIAA may seek an explanation and write for departmental punishment; under another it may only forward the complaint to the ministry; under a third it should decline and point the resident elsewhere.

Possible improvements and trade-offs

Amend the CIAA Act (the CIAA itself recommends timely amendment) to state expressly what, if anything, the CIAA may do about improper conduct under the 2015 Constitution.
Removes doubt; requires a policy choice on whether a constitutional body should handle non-corruption misconduct, which has resource and overlap consequences.
Assign improper conduct clearly to another body (for example through the national vigilance law the National Vigilance Centre says is being drafted, or to departmental authorities), and convert the CIAA's role into referral only.
Aligns with a narrow reading of Article 239(1); risks weaker follow-up if the receiving body lacks independence or capacity.
Leave the law unchanged and let the courts settle the question if a case arises.
No legislative effort; uncertainty continues until a ruling, and a ruling may address only the facts of one case.

Questions for legal review

Does Article 239(1) limit the CIAA's investigation power to corruption, and does Article 239(6) permit federal law to add an improper-conduct function?
Has the Supreme Court ruled on the CIAA's power over improper conduct since 2015 (2072)?
What does the pending CIAA Act amendment bill propose on improper conduct?

Research status

Researched: 2026-10-12
Confidence: Medium confidence — The constitutional and statutory texts were read, and the CIAA's own report and the National Vigilance Centre's report describe the change and the lack of clarity. Confidence is not high because no court ruling was found, the strongest direct statement comes from a personal paper, and the official reports do not themselves say the Act is inconsistent with the Constitution.
Review: Not yet reviewed by a qualified lawyer.

Still unresolved

No Supreme Court decision on the CIAA's improper-conduct jurisdiction under the 2015 Constitution was searched for in Nepal Kanoon Patrika.
The text of the CIAA Act amendment bill and its status in Parliament were not opened.
Statistics on how many improper-conduct complaints the CIAA forwards, and what the receiving bodies did, were not compiled.