AvailableNepali translation awaiting review

Electricity and hydropower

Nepal now sells surplus electricity abroad in the wet season but still buys power in the dry season; the big choices are how much to build, who it is for, who pays, and how much risk to accept.

Long-term goalBuild enough clean electricity for a growing economy

The Sixteenth Plan calls for preparing infrastructure for 28,500 MW of generation over 12 years, and the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) says it backs a national goal of 28,500 MW installed capacity by 2035. Plants, transmission lines and new demand take many years to build, so this is a decade-long goal rather than a single decision.91

Contested choiceExport or use at home, and who should invest

Official plans aim both to raise domestic use and to export surplus power, and to involve private and foreign investors while giving domestic investment priority in reservoir projects. How to balance these aims is a policy choice, and news media have reported public criticism of the long-term export arrangement with India.91013

Urgent problemDry-season shortfalls, grid bottlenecks and wasted wet-season power

In FY 2025/26 Nepal still imported electricity in the dry season. NEA says that using new generation fully, and keeping curtailment low, depends on sustained growth in domestic use and more export opportunities, and that the transmission and distribution investment needed will require money well beyond the cash surplus from its normal operations.12

Updated 2026-10-10 · Version 2 · Sources · Corrections & right of reply

Question 1

What is the issue, and why does it matter?

Nepal's total installed generation capacity reached 4,120 MW in FY 2025/26, including 529 MW added that year. Of the 18,624 GWh of electricity available, NEA and its subsidiaries supplied 36%, private (independent) producers 58%, and imports from India 6%. Average use per person rose to 496 kWh from 465 kWh the year before.1

NEA reports that Nepal was a net exporter of electricity in FY 2025/26: exports totalled 3,965 GWh (3,817 GWh to India and 148 GWh to Bangladesh, per its Finance Directorate), while 1,171 GWh was imported from India in the dry season. Export sales earned NRs. 29.31 billion and imports cost NRs. 10.56 billion. (The same report gives a provisional export figure of 3,938 GWh elsewhere; see the 'Uncertain' evidence below.)12

Why this matters: most of Nepal's electricity comes from rivers, which run high in the monsoon and low in winter, so the country can have too much power in one season and too little in another. Electricity can replace imported fuels in cooking, transport and industry and can earn foreign currency, but large plants and power lines take years to build, need large sums of money, and change rivers, land and the lives of people who live nearby.

Question 2

What do current law and policy say?

The Constitution's state policies direct the State to use natural resources in an environmentally friendly and sustainable way, guided by fairness between generations, with fair sharing of benefits and priority and preferential rights for local communities; to develop water resources for multiple uses, giving priority to national investment based on public participation; and to ensure a reliable, affordable supply of energy for citizens' basic needs by generating and developing renewable energy (Article 51(g)(1)–(3)).3

Responsibility is split across levels of government. Inland and inter-province transmission lines and large central-level electricity projects are federal powers (Schedule 5, items 12 and 14); province-level electricity services are provincial (Schedule 6, item 7); small hydropower projects and alternative energy are local (Schedule 8, item 19); electricity services and royalties from natural resources are concurrent (Schedule 9, items 5, 6 and 14). All three levels must share benefits from natural resources fairly, with a portion going, in accordance with law, to project-affected regions and local communities as royalty, services or goods, and must give priority to local communities that wish to invest, in the portion provided by law (Article 59(4)–(5)). The National Natural Resources and Fiscal Commission sets the bases for each government's share in investment and returns from natural resources (Article 251(1)(h)).456

The Constitution requires the federal law on treaties to provide that the ratification, accession, acceptance or approval of treaties or agreements on natural resources and the distribution of their uses, to which Nepal or the Government of Nepal is to become a party, be made by a two-thirds majority of the total then members of both Houses of the Federal Parliament; if such a treaty or agreement is of an ordinary nature that does not affect the nation extensively, seriously or in the long term, a simple majority of members present at a meeting of the House of Representatives is enough (Article 279(1)–(2)).7

Under the Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 2074 (Chapter 3), the Electricity Regulatory Commission sets electricity tariffs and wheeling charges, gives consent to power purchase agreements, protects consumers, works against tariff cartels, provides for open access to the grid, and settles disputes between licensees and complaints from consumers.8

The Sixteenth Plan (FY 2024/25–2028/29) says to supply domestic demand first and then export surplus electricity in bilateral, sub-regional and regional markets; to increase government investment while working with private, domestic and foreign investors; to protect and prioritise domestic investment in reservoir and semi-reservoir projects while preserving national interest when mobilising foreign investment; to achieve full electrification within two years; and to prepare infrastructure for 28,500 MW over the next 12 years. It also calls for promoting electric stoves and electric vehicles, and time-based electricity tariffs to raise off-peak use.91011

Question 3

What is known, uncertain or disputed?

Known

In FY 2025/26 the national grid covered 97.6% (NEA's measure), and 18 local levels were still not connected. NEA had 5.927 million consumers. System losses fell to 12.16% from 12.26% the year before.1

Independent (private) power producers play a large role in generation. NEA reports 227 operating projects owned by independent power producers, with a combined capacity of 3,459 MW, and adds that its subsidiaries' projects contribute 748.4 MW to this total. In its section on private-sector participation it reports 213 further projects (6,472.21 MW) under construction after reaching financial closure. NEA has 545 power purchase agreements with independent producers totalling 12,135 MW, including 49 solar projects (675 MW) signed in FY 2025/26 after a tariff-based competitive bidding process. High-voltage transmission lines totalled 7,110 circuit-km, with a further 1,650 circuit-km under construction.112

Cross-border trade runs through India's power exchange market, medium-term agreements (two of 200 MW each to Haryana for five years; up to 200 MW to Bihar for three years, extendable to five) and a 40 MW arrangement with Bangladesh; NEA reports total approved export quantity of about 1,200 MW. NEA reports that the 13th Nepal–India Joint Working Group/Joint Steering Committee meeting (14–15 July 2026) approved a combined capacity of 1,650 MW for export by Nepal and 1,400 MW for import on the Dhalkebar–Muzaffarpur and Dhalkebar–Sitamarhi 400 kV lines. Separately, the Kathmandu Post reported that Nepal's and India's energy secretaries signed a long-term power trade document in Kathmandu on 4 January 2024 that sets a target of 10,000 MW of electricity exports to India within ten years.12113

Uncertain

Climate hazards to hydropower are real but hard to price. A peer-reviewed study of 257 Himalayan hydropower projects found about 66% lie on potential glacial-lake outburst flood paths and up to a third of those could face floods well above their design levels. In Nepal, the 111 MW Rasuwagadhi plant was badly damaged by a glacial-lake-outburst-induced flash flood on 8 July 2025, halting generation; units restarted in stages over the following months. How much such risks will add to costs and reduce output in future is not established in the sources reviewed.1415

It is uncertain whether demand and export capacity will grow fast enough. The Sixteenth Plan targets 11,769 MW of installed capacity by FY 2028/29, against 4,120 MW reached in FY 2025/26, and NEA says avoiding curtailment depends on sustained growth in domestic use and new export opportunities. A 2022 World Bank Group report estimated an average of US$200 million a year in additional export revenue could be generated in 2022–2025; this was a projection, not a measured result.16117

Official figures do not always match within the same report. NEA's FY 2025/26 report gives exports as 3,965 GWh in the Managing Director's report and the Finance Directorate section, but 3,938 GWh in the Load Dispatch Centre table, which it labels provisional. The Managing Director's report calls the 3,965 GWh 'exports to India', while the Finance Directorate splits it into 3,817 GWh to India and 148 GWh to Bangladesh. Domestic consumption is given as 12,376 GWh (Managing Director's report) and as 12,394 GWh (Finance Directorate). This page does not choose between these figures. The Sixteenth Plan gives FY 2022/23 installed capacity as 2,877 MW in its target table, while its review text says capacity connected to the national grid had 'so far' reached 3,200 MW. Readers should treat small differences as reporting differences, not trends.11821619

Disputed

The long-term export arrangement with India has been publicly debated. The Kathmandu Post reported (4 January 2024) a statement by five signatories who said they found 'the decision to guarantee 10,000 MW of Nepal's hydroelectricity for the Indian market problematic'. India's public broadcaster reported (3 August 2023) that India's power minister told the Lok Sabha that the two countries had finalised an agreement to increase power exports from Nepal to India to 10,000 MW within 10 years, and that imports from Nepal would be based on commercial transactions by the entities concerned. These are reported statements. The official text of the arrangement was not located for this review, so its terms and legal form are not described here.1320

Questions 4–5

What are the options, and what do they cost and achieve?

Options are listed in no particular order. Policy Nepal does not recommend one; real policies often combine them.

Export-led growth: build for regional markets112217

Prioritise cross-border transmission lines and long-term sale agreements with India and Bangladesh, so that generation can grow faster than domestic demand and wet-season surplus is sold rather than spilled.

Benefits
  • Earns foreign currency; export sales were NRs. 29.31 billion in FY 2025/26.
  • Reduces the risk that new plants have to cut output in the wet season for lack of buyers.
  • Larger, more certain markets can make big projects easier to finance.
Costs
  • Requires costly cross-border lines and approvals on both sides of the border.
  • Income depends on buyers' rules, prices and demand in neighbouring countries.
Trade-offs
  • Power committed for export in the wet season does not by itself solve dry-season shortages at home.
  • Treaties or agreements on natural resources to which Nepal is a party may need two-thirds parliamentary ratification under Article 279 unless of an ordinary nature; that can slow decisions but adds scrutiny.
What implementation needs
  • Complete cross-border lines already planned or under construction (e.g. Butwal–Gorakhpur, Dhalkebar–Sitamarhi, Inaruwa–Purnia).
  • Negotiate longer-term sale contracts and clarify the legal status and approval route of government-to-government arrangements.

Use it at home: electrify cooking, transport and industry1116222318

Grow domestic demand so that more of Nepal's electricity replaces imported fuels: electric cooking, electric vehicles, electric boilers in industry, and tariffs that reward off-peak use, backed by stronger local distribution networks.

Benefits
  • Keeps the value of electricity inside the economy and reduces fuel imports.
  • Uses wet-season surplus that might otherwise be curtailed.
  • Cleaner indoor and city air where electricity replaces firewood or petrol and diesel (explanation, not measured here).
Costs
  • Households and firms must buy new stoves, vehicles or boilers; the FY 2026/27 budget offers concessional credit for industries replacing traditional boilers with electric ones and allocates NRs. 220 million for 100 industries to switch boilers.
  • Local wiring and transformers need upgrading to carry higher loads.
Trade-offs
  • Higher domestic demand in winter can deepen dry-season shortages unless supply is also firmed up.
  • The FY 2026/27 budget provides for VAT at a concessional rate on electricity use above 50 units a month sold to final consumers and changes customs duty on electric vehicles to an ad valorem basis; how these tax changes affect the uptake of electric cooking and vehicles is not established in the sources reviewed.
What implementation needs
  • Track electric-stove targets in the Sixteenth Plan and time-of-use tariffs set by the regulator.
  • Reinforce distribution networks and connect the remaining local levels.

Firm up supply: storage hydropower, solar and batteries2110112145

Shift the mix away from mainly run-of-river plants toward storage and peaking hydropower, plus solar and battery storage, so that winter and evening demand can be met at home with fewer imports.

Benefits
  • Addresses dry-season and peak-hour shortfalls directly; the budget's 100 MW battery project in Kathmandu Valley is aimed at dry-season peak scarcity.
  • The Sixteenth Plan describes large reservoir projects as able to balance seasonal swings in supply and demand.
Costs
  • Storage projects are large and slow; several flagship reservoirs named in the plan and budget are still awaiting financing or construction.
  • Reservoirs submerge land and can displace households (general explanation), so the Constitution's benefit-sharing duties toward affected communities become central.
Trade-offs
  • Hydropower projects in glacier-fed Himalayan valleys, whether storage or run-of-river, can face glacial-lake outburst floods that are hard to predict.
  • Solar and batteries can be built faster but cover shorter periods than seasonal storage.
What implementation needs
  • Reach financial closure for Dudhkoshi, advance construction of Budhigandaki and complete Tanahu (storage projects named in the budget).
  • Continue competitive solar procurement and battery storage pilots; apply climate-hazard assessment in site choice.

Who pays: public and domestic-led versus private and foreign investment1921358

Decide how much of the build-out is financed by government, NEA, pension funds and Nepali citizens, and how much by private developers and foreign investors, including for transmission lines.

Benefits
  • Public and domestic ownership (e.g. Employees Provident Fund investment, investment by local communities) keeps returns in the country and fits the Constitution's priority for national investment and local communities.
  • Private and foreign capital can build faster than public budgets allow; private producers already supply most electricity.
Costs
  • NEA says investment needs exceed its cash surplus; its FY 2025/26 profit fell mainly because of foreign-exchange losses of NRs. 11.5 billion on loans.
  • Power purchase agreements with private producers create long-term payment obligations for NEA and, ultimately, consumers.
Trade-offs
  • Foreign loans in other currencies bring exchange-rate risk; domestic sources avoid that particular risk but may be more limited in size.
  • Opening transmission to private builders (tariff-based competitive bidding) may speed construction but adds contracts the regulator must oversee.
What implementation needs
  • Set clear rules for which projects are reserved for domestic investment and on what terms foreign investment is invited.
  • Use the Electricity Regulatory Commission's tariff and PPA approval role to keep costs transparent.

Combining options

These options are not either/or. Plans already pursue export and domestic use together; the real choices are about sequence and weight: for example, how much transmission money goes to cross-border lines versus local distribution, whether storage projects are built before or after more run-of-river capacity, and which projects are reserved for public or domestic investors. A mix that grows home demand while building export lines and some storage spreads risk, but also spreads limited money across more fronts.

Question 6

Who is responsible?

Federal
Ministry of Energy, Water Resources and Irrigation

Federal ministry responsible for energy; its website lists the Energy Development Roadmap, 2081.24

Federal
Nepal Electricity Authority (state-owned utility) and its subsidiaries

Generates, transmits and distributes electricity; buys power from private producers under power purchase agreements; runs cross-border trade.112

Independent body
Electricity Regulatory Commission

Sets tariffs, consents to power purchase agreements, protects consumers and settles disputes.8

Federal
Ministry of Finance

Allocates the annual budget for generation and transmission and sets taxes affecting electricity and electric vehicles.2122

Federal
Federal Parliament

Ratifies or approves treaties and agreements on natural resources to which Nepal is to become a party (two-thirds of the total members of both Houses; a simple majority of members present in the House of Representatives if of an ordinary nature).7

Provincial
Provincial governments

Province-level electricity services; share electricity services and natural-resource royalties concurrently with the other levels.4

Local
Local governments (municipalities and rural municipalities)

Small hydropower projects and alternative energy; like the federal and provincial levels, must share natural-resource benefits fairly, including with project-affected regions and local communities.45

Independent body
National Natural Resources and Fiscal Commission

Sets the bases for federal, provincial and local shares of investment and returns from natural resources such as hydropower.6

Question 7

What have parties and leaders said and done?

What was said or promised is shown apart from what was recorded as done. Every entry needs a dated source. A missing entry means the position is not established, not that someone opposes or is neutral.

Party positions on electricity and hydropower are being researched and will be added for all parties with seats in the House of Representatives together, using the same question and each party's own documents. Until then no party positions are shown. The records above are government actions (budget allocations and trade arrangements in operation) from official sources; they are not party positions.

Said or promised

Stated position · Budget Speech for FY 2026/27 (2026)

Government of Nepal (Ministry of Finance)

The FY 2026/27 budget provides for VAT at a concessional rate on electricity consumption above 50 units a month sold to final consumers, replaces the capacity-based customs duty on electric vehicles with an ad valorem duty, and allocates NRs. 220 million to help 100 industries move to electric or bio-briquette boilers.2223

Recorded actions and outcomes

Funding decision · Budget Speech for FY 2026/27 (2026)

Government of Nepal (Ministry of Finance)

The FY 2026/27 budget allocates NRs. 85.54 billion for generation, transmission and distribution, including NRs. 70 billion for transmission lines and substations; targets 5,535 MW installed capacity with 1,040 MW added (670 MW hydro, 370 MW solar); and announces a 100 MW battery storage system in Kathmandu Valley and a 2.5 MW green hydrogen pilot in Hetauda.21

Implementation · FY 2025/26 (2082/83 BS)

Nepal Electricity Authority (state-owned utility)

As of FY 2025/26, NEA operates medium-term export agreements of 400 MW to Haryana and up to 200 MW to Bihar, a 40 MW arrangement with Bangladesh, and sales on India's power exchange, with about 1,200 MW of export quantity approved in total.121

Question 8

What would progress look like, and when do we check again?

IndicatorLatest official figureOfficial targetRevisit
Installed electricity generation capacity (MW)116 4,120 MW (FY 2025/26)1 11,769 MW (FY 2028/29)16 2027-09
Electricity consumption per person (kWh per year)116 496 kWh (FY 2025/26)1 700 kWh (FY 2028/29)16 2027-09
National grid coverage (NEA's measure, %; local levels not yet connected)1 97.6%; 18 local levels not connected (FY 2025/26)1 No official target found 2027-09
Population with access to electricity (Sixteenth Plan indicator, %)1619 96.7% (FY 2022/23)1619 100% (FY 2028/29)16 2027-09
Electricity system losses (%)116 12.16% (FY 2025/26)1 10.8% (FY 2028/29)16 2027-09
Electric stove installation (Sixteenth Plan indicator, thousand)16 54.82 thousand (FY 2022/23)16 1,000 thousand (1 million) (FY 2028/29)16 2027-09

Sources

Grouped by type of evidence. Government plans show what government intends; they are not proof of results. Party material shows what a party says.

Constitution & law

  1. Constitution of Nepal (English translation, incorporating the Second Amendment) — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, 2072 BS / 2015 (as amended). Article 51(g)(1)–(3), pp. 27–28. Checked 2026-10-10
  2. Constitution of Nepal (English translation, incorporating the Second Amendment) — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, 2072 BS / 2015 (as amended). Schedule 5 items 12, 14 (p. 194); Schedule 6 item 7 (p. 196); Schedule 8 item 19 (p. 201); Schedule 9 items 5, 6, 14 (p. 202). Checked 2026-10-10
  3. Constitution of Nepal (English translation, incorporating the Second Amendment) — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, 2072 BS / 2015 (as amended). Article 59(4)–(5), p. 36. Checked 2026-10-10
  4. Constitution of Nepal (English translation, incorporating the Second Amendment) — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, 2072 BS / 2015 (as amended). Article 251(1)(h), p. 143. Checked 2026-10-10
  5. Constitution of Nepal (English translation, incorporating the Second Amendment) — Nepal Law Commission, Government of Nepal, 2072 BS / 2015 (as amended). Article 279(1)–(2), pp. 164–165. Checked 2026-10-10
  6. काम, कर्तव्य र अधिकारहरू (Functions, duties and powers) — under the Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 2074, Chapter 3 — Electricity Regulatory Commission, Nepal, not stated. Web page, sections on tariff and power trade regulation, competition and consumer protection, dispute resolution; refers to Act Chapter 3 (no section numbers given). Checked 2026-10-10

Government plans & policy

  1. The Sixteenth Plan (Fiscal Year 2024/25 – 2028/29) — English (unofficial translation) — National Planning Commission, Government of Nepal, 2024. Programme 18 'Hydropower development and expansion program', p. 64. Checked 2026-10-10
  2. The Sixteenth Plan (Fiscal Year 2024/25 – 2028/29) — English (unofficial translation) — National Planning Commission, Government of Nepal, 2024. Strategy 8 'Energy production, transmission and trade' (p. 112); Programme 8 'Mobilization of investment for reservoir-dam projects and international transmission lines' (p. 119). Checked 2026-10-10
  3. The Sixteenth Plan (Fiscal Year 2024/25 – 2028/29) — English (unofficial translation) — National Planning Commission, Government of Nepal, 2024. p. 212 (electric stoves, LPG subsidy, electric vehicles, time-based tariffs). Checked 2026-10-10
  4. The Sixteenth Plan (Fiscal Year 2024/25 – 2028/29) — English (unofficial translation) — National Planning Commission, Government of Nepal, 2024. Indicator tables 'Energy' and 'Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency' (FY 2022/23 actual, FY 2028/29 target), p. 123. Checked 2026-10-10
  5. The Sixteenth Plan (Fiscal Year 2024/25 – 2028/29) — English (unofficial translation) — National Planning Commission, Government of Nepal, 2024. Development of Quality Infrastructure and Intensive Inter-connectivity, review section 6 'Energy, water resources and irrigation infrastructure', p. 109. Checked 2026-10-10
  6. Budget Speech for Fiscal Year 2026/27 (English, unofficial translation) — Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal, 2026. Paragraph 43 'Clean Energy Development', clauses (a)–(i) and closing allocation sentence, pp. 21–23 (printed page numbers). Checked 2026-10-10
  7. Budget Speech for Fiscal Year 2026/27 (English, unofficial translation) — Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal, 2026. Paragraph 69 'Voluntary Compliance and Broadening Tax Base', clauses (b)–(c), p. 44 (printed page number). Checked 2026-10-10
  8. Budget Speech for Fiscal Year 2026/27 (English, unofficial translation) — Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal, 2026. Paragraph 55 'Industrial Development', clause (d), p. 35 (printed page number). Checked 2026-10-10
  9. ऊर्जा विकास मार्गचित्र, २०८१ (Energy Development Roadmap, 2081) — ministry web page — Ministry of Energy, Water Resources and Irrigation, Government of Nepal, page dated 4 Bhadra 2082. Web page listing the document (PDF attachment opened but not machine-readable). Checked 2026-10-10

Official data

  1. A Year in Review: Fiscal Year 2025/2026 (Annual Report) — Managing Director's Report — Nepal Electricity Authority, FY 2025/26 report (2026). Managing Director's Report, pp. 1–7 (capacity, peak demand, energy balance, exports/imports, consumers, grid coverage, losses, finances, transmission, IPPs, cross-border trade, way forward). Checked 2026-10-10
  2. A Year in Review: Fiscal Year 2025/2026 (Annual Report) — Finance Directorate — Nepal Electricity Authority, FY 2025/26 report (2026). Finance Directorate, '2. Operational Performance', p. 139. Checked 2026-10-10
  3. A Year in Review: Fiscal Year 2025/2026 (Annual Report) — Business Development Directorate, Power Trade Department — Nepal Electricity Authority, FY 2025/26 report (2026). Power Trade Department, p. 98: PPA energy-mix table, medium-term agreements, table 'Status of Approval for Sale of Power to India and Bangladesh' (total 1,200.01 MW) and 13th JWG/JSC decisions. Checked 2026-10-10
  4. A Year in Review: Fiscal Year 2025/2026 (Annual Report) — Business Development Directorate, Rasuwagadhi Hydropower Company Limited — Nepal Electricity Authority, FY 2025/26 report (2026). Section 14 'Rasuwagadhi Hydropower Company Limited (RGHPCL)', p. 120. Checked 2026-10-10
  5. A Year in Review: Fiscal Year 2025/2026 (Annual Report) — System Operation / Load Dispatch Centre — Nepal Electricity Authority, FY 2025/26 report (2026). Load Dispatch Centre key-figures table (row 6 'Total Exported Energy (Annual)', 3938 GWh; table footnote: 'Provisional figures based on LDC data'), p. 44. Checked 2026-10-10

Independent research

  1. Schwanghart, Worni, Huggel, Stoffel & Korup, 'Uncertainty in the Himalayan energy–water nexus: estimating regional exposure to glacial lake outburst floods', Environ. Res. Lett. 11, 074005, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/7/074005 — Environmental Research Letters (IOP Publishing); repository copy University of Potsdam, 2016. Abstract. Checked 2026-10-10
  2. Integrating Climate Change into Nepal's Development Strategy Key to Build Resilience, Says New World Bank Group Report (press release on the Nepal Country Climate and Development Report) — World Bank Group, 15 September 2022. Press release text (hydropower export revenue estimate; net zero 2045 pledge). Checked 2026-10-10

News reports

  1. Nepal, India ink 10-year, 10,000MW power trade — The Kathmandu Post, 4 January 2024. Full article (Post Report). Checked 2026-10-10
  2. India, Nepal finalized agreement for Long-Term Power Trade to increase quantum of export power: Govt in LS — All India Radio News (newsonair.gov.in), public broadcaster of India, 3 August 2023. Full article. Checked 2026-10-10

Corrections & right of reply

Parties, leaders and readers may ask us to correct an error or add a documented response. Corrections are published visibly with the date and reason; no one can pay to change coverage.

The submission channel is not open yet. It will open once an editorial contact and review process are in place.

Change history
  1. 2026-10-10 — First draft of the energy-electricity issue page (version 1): classification, why, law and policy, evidence, four options, responsibilities, government records, five progress indicators, sources. (New topic researched from primary sources (Constitution, Sixteenth Plan, FY 2026/27 budget speech, NEA FY 2025/26 annual report, ERC) for editorial review. Party positions deliberately omitted pending all-party research.)
  2. 2026-10-10 — Version 2: independent fact-check. Every figure, date and legal provision was re-checked against the cited documents (NEA FY 2025/26 annual report, Sixteenth Plan English translation, Constitution English translation, FY 2026/27 budget speech, ERC page, World Bank press release, Schwanghart et al. abstract, Kathmandu Post and All India Radio articles). (Pre-publication verification. Most items matched the sources; the corrections below record each change made.)
  3. 2026-10-10 — Split the progress indicator 'Access to electricity' into 'National grid coverage (NEA's measure)' (baseline 97.6%, FY 2025/26; no official target recorded) and 'Population with access to electricity (Sixteenth Plan indicator)' (baseline 96.7%, FY 2022/23; target 100% by FY 2028/29). (The old indicator paired an NEA grid-coverage baseline with a Sixteenth Plan population-access target, which are different measures. Each indicator now has only the baseline and target its own source states.)
  4. 2026-10-10 — Rewrote the 4 January 2024 Nepal–India long-term power trade item in evidence.known: it now says the Kathmandu Post reported that the two energy secretaries signed a long-term power trade document in Kathmandu with a 10,000 MW, ten-year export target. Previously it said 'the two governments signed'. (The Kathmandu Post names the energy secretaries as signatories and uses both 'agreement' and 'memorandum of understanding'. Only what the news source establishes is kept, attributed to the source. No official Government of Nepal or Government of India text was found (MoFA page body missing; Indian Embassy page HTTP 500; the MEA bilateral brief of 20 June 2024 refers only to the 'finalization of the agreement for long term power trade').)
  5. 2026-10-10 — Rewrote evidence.disputed on the India arrangement: removed the characterisation of the document as a memorandum of understanding, quoted the critics' statement as reported, kept the All India Radio report of the Indian minister's Lok Sabha reply, and stated that terms and legal form are not described because no official text was found. Adjusted the contested-choice rationale to match. (Legal form and terms are not established by news reports; the page should not state them.)
  6. 2026-10-10 — Expanded the 'figures do not match' item in evidence.uncertain: exports 3,965 GWh (MD report, Finance Directorate) vs 3,938 GWh (Load Dispatch Centre table, labelled provisional); the MD report calls the 3,965 GWh 'exports to India' while Finance splits it 3,817 India / 148 Bangladesh; consumption 12,376 GWh (MD report) vs 12,394 GWh (Finance Directorate). The page states that it does not choose between them. The why item on exports now attributes the India/Bangladesh split to the Finance Directorate and points to this uncertainty. (Instruction to disclose differing NEA figures rather than choose silently; the provisional label and the MD-report wording were found during verification.)
  7. 2026-10-10 — Corrected the private-producer item in evidence.known: removed 'Private producers are now the main builders of generation'; now says NEA reports 227 IPP-owned operating projects with 3,459 MW and that NEA subsidiaries' projects 'contribute 748.4 MW to this total'; 213 projects (6,472.21 MW) under construction are attributed to NEA's private-sector section; added that the 12,135 MW is across 545 PPAs, and that the 675 MW of solar was selected by tariff-based competitive bidding. (The NEA text does not establish that all 3,459 MW is privately owned or that private producers are the 'main builders'. The added details are on the same pages (MD report p. 4; Power Trade Department p. 98).)
  8. 2026-10-10 — Corrected the 16th Plan '3,200 MW' wording in evidence.uncertain to 'capacity connected to the national grid had so far reached 3,200 MW'. (The plan's review text (p. 109) says 'so far' and does not tie the figure to FY 2022/23.)
  9. 2026-10-10 — Corrected source locators: budget para 43 is pp. 21–23 (was pp. 22–24); para 55(d) is p. 35 (was p. 36); para 69(b)–(c) is p. 44 (was p. 45); Rasuwagadhi section is p. 120 (was pp. 120–121); NEA power trade material is on p. 98 (was pp. 98–99). Added the LDC table's 'provisional' footnote to the nea-ar-2026-ldc locator, and a note to npc-16-targets-p123 on the household vs population definition of 96.7%. (Printed page numbers checked against the downloaded PDFs.)
  10. 2026-10-10 — Made Article 279 wording more precise in law_policy, the export-led tradeoff and the Federal Parliament role: the Constitution requires the federal law to provide for two-thirds ratification, accession, acceptance or approval of treaties or agreements on natural resources to which Nepal or the Government of Nepal is to become a party, with the ordinary-nature exception. Added 'in accordance with law' and 'in the portion provided by law' to the Article 59(4)–(5) summary. (Matches the constitutional text (pp. 36, 164–165).)
  11. 2026-10-10 — Softened unsupported statements: the budget-tax tradeoff no longer says the VAT and EV duty changes 'raise revenue but may slow uptake' (now: effect not established); the urgent-problem rationale now follows NEA's wording on curtailment and investment needs; the dam-hazard tradeoff now refers to glacial-lake outburst floods for storage and run-of-river projects (the study does not cover sediment); the storage implementation step now matches the budget (financial closure for Dudhkoshi, construction of Budhigandaki, completion of Tanahu); the domestic-use cost now names only the budget's boiler measures; the ministry role now says its website lists the roadmap rather than that it 'leads federal energy policy'; the local-government role now follows Article 59(4); 'cumulative' was removed from the electric-stove indicator; the domestic-sources tradeoff no longer says 'cheaper'. (These statements went beyond what the cited sources say.)
  12. 2026-10-10 — Nepali text: converted all numerals in running Nepali text to Devanagari (legal clause letters kept as छ and ज); corrected ERC syndicate wording ('हुन नपाउने व्यवस्था गर्छ') and the firm-supply summary phrasing; updated Nepali text for every English change above. (Bilingual fidelity and consistent numerals. Nepali still needs native review.)
  13. 2026-10-10 — Published after independent source-by-source verification. Party positions not yet included (to be added for all House parties together). Nepali text awaiting native review. (Editorial decisions: FAOLEX-hosted English 16th Plan accepted (NPC hosts only Nepali). India long-term arrangement kept only as reported by news, with legal form not described. Access indicator split into grid coverage and population access.)